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I. INTRODUCTION
T HE Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act
(FIFRA)I defines pesticide as " (1) any substance or mixture
of substances intended for preventing, destroying, repelling or
mitigating any pest, and (2) any substance intended for use as a
plant regulator, defoliant, or desiccant." 2 In the United States,
significant increases in the amount and frequency of pesticide ap-
plication began after World War II in order to protect newly de-
veloped hybrid crops against pests and to fully realize
productivity.3 Moreover, pest resistance to pesticides requires in-
1. The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act §§ 2-31, 7
U.S.C. §§ 13 6 -13 6 y (1988) [hereinafter FIFRA]. FIFRA was amended in 1988
by Pub. L. No. 100-532, 102 Stat. 2654, 100th Cong. 2d Sess. (Oct. 25, 1988).
The 1988 Amendments did not fundamentally change FIFRA, but do provide
for accelerated reregistration of pesticides. Some provisions of the 1988
Amendments are discussed infra notes 34-42 and accompanying text.
2. Id. § 2(u), 7 U.S.C. § 136(u). See also H.R. REP. No. 100-939, 100th
Cong., 2d Sess. 26, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3474.
FIFRA defines pest as follows:
(1) any insect, rodent, nematode, fungus, weed, or (2) any other form
of terrestrial or aquatic plant or animal life of virus, bacteria, or other
micro-organism... which the Administrator declares to be a pest.
Id. § 2(t), 7 U.S.C. § 136(t).
3. See, e.g., 2 F. GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 8.01(1) (1989);
G. WARE, FUNDAMENTALS OF PESTICIDES 1 (1982); Gilbert, America Tackles the Pes-
ticide Crisis, N.Y. Times, October 8, 1989 (Magazine, Part II), at 22; H.R. REP.
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creasing amounts and frequency of application to achieve effec-
tive control.4 Currently, approximately 2.6 billion pounds of
pesticides are used in the United States each year.5 Pesticides are
used on food crops as well as on forests, lakes, city parks, lawns,
playing fields, hospitals, schools, offices and homes. 6
These increases in pesticide use are disturbing. There is a
growing recognition that pesticides upset the natural ecological
balance.7 Moreover, the manner in which pesticides are regu-
lated does not adequately assure that pesticides on the market are
beneficial or safe to humans exposed to them. In this Article, Part
I will examine the existing framework for regulating pesticides.
The remainder of this Article will evaluate how courts deal with
individuals, such as agricultural workers, who are exposed to pes-
ticides at the time of application.8 Part II will discuss some
problems in assessing the safety of pesticides and will survey the
medical literature addressing health risks associated with expo-
sure to pesticides. Part III will survey the case law dealing with
No. 100-939, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 26, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 3474.
4. See, e.g., R. METCALF & W. LUCKMAN, INTRODUCTION TO INSECT PEST MAN-
AGEMENT (1982).
5. L. MOTT & K. SNYDER, PESTICIDE ALERT 5 (1987) (citing EPA, OFFICE OF
PESTICIDE PROGRAMS, PESTICIDE INDUSTRY SALES AND USAGE 1985 MARKET ESTI-
MATES table 4 (September 1986)).
6. Id. (citing Shabecoff, Pesticide Control Finally Tops the EPA's List of Most
Pressing Problems, N.Y. Times, Mar. 6, 1986, at B12, col. 3. Nonagricultural use of
pesticides was the subject of recent Congressional hearings. The Use and Regula-
tion of Lawn Care Chemicals: Hearing before Subcomm. on Toxic Substances, Environmen-
tal Oversight, Research and Development of the Senate Comm. on Environment and Public
Works, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) [hereinafter Hearings]. The use of lawn care
pesticides was examined in LAWN CARE PESTICIDES: RISK REMAIN UNCERTAIN
WHILE PROHIBITED SAFETY CLAIMS CONTINUE: UNITED STATES GENERAL AC-
COUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMM. ON TOXIC SUBSTANCES,
ENVIRONMENTAL OVERSIGHT, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE SENATE
COMM. ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS (1990) [hereinafter LAWN CARE
PESTICIDES].
7. See, e.g., R. CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962); 2 F. GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVI-
RONMENTAL LAW § 8.01 (1989); L. MoTr & K. SNYDER, PESTICIDE ALERT 58
(1987); UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, OFFICE OF POLICY,
PLANNING AND EVALUATION, COMPARING RISKS AND SEITING ENVIRONMENTAL PRI-
ORITIES: OVERVIEW OF THREE REGIONAL PROJECTS xi, 42, 58 (August 1989),
three EPA regions ranked environmental problems within their regions to help
set priorities for future programs. All three regions consistently ranked pesti-
cides as a high health risk. The report suggests that inadequate government
resources are devoted to controlling these risks.
8. There is growing concern about risks associated with exposure to pesti-
cides in other settings, such as through ingestion of foods with pesticide resi-
dues or through exposure to pesticide contaminated groundwater. These
problems are beyond the scope of this article. See, e.g., L. MoTr & K. SNYDER,
PESTICIDE ALERT (1987).
3
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injury caused by non-target exposure to pesticides, comparing
cases awarding remedies for property loss caused primarily by
pesticide spray drift to cases involving human exposure. Part IV
will discuss how and why courts should reconsider the manner in
which they handle cases involving human exposure to pesticides.
A. The Regulatory Framework
Federal pesticide regulation in the United States dates back
to the Insecticide Act of 1910,9 which was intended to protect
growers and cattlemen against improper practices of chemical
manufacturers, such as the manufacture, sale or transportation of
adulterated or misbranded insecticides.' 0 In 1947, Congress re-
placed the Insecticide Act with FIFRA." FIFRA extended the
purpose of regulation to the protection of the public against the
adverse effects caused by economic poisons through a system of
registration administered by the Department of Agriculture.' 2 In
1970, pesticide registration became the responsibility of the Ad-
ministrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).' 3
FIFRA was substantially amended in 1972. These amendments
established the basic framework for the regulation of chemical
pesticide use in the United States today. 14
FIFRA prohibits the sale or distribution of any pesticide un-
9. Act of April 26, 1910, ch. 191, 36 Stat. 331.
10. 2 F. GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 8.02, at 8-14 (1989).
11. Pub. L. No. 86-139, Law ofJune 25, 1947, Ch. 125, 61 Stat. 163 (1947)
(codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 135-135k (1988)).
12. 2 F. GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 8.02 (1989).
13. Id. at 8-15.
14. Federal regulation of chemical pesticides also occurs under the Food,
Drug & Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-393 (1988) [hereinafter FDCA]. Under
FDCA section 346a(b), the Administrator of the EPA may set tolerances for pes-
ticides in raw agricultural commodities to the extent necessary to protect public
health; FDCA section 346a(a) prohibits the use of a pesticide on or in raw agri-
cultural commodities which have not generally been recognized by experts as
safe unless EPA has established a tolerance or an exemption from a tolerance.
See Nader v. EPA, 859 F.2d 747, 748 (9th Cir. 1988); National Coalition Against
the Misuse of Pesticides v. Thomas, 809 F.2d 875 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Problems
associated with pesticide residues in products for consumption is beyond the
scope of this article.
It should also be noted that there are nonchemical means of pest control,
such as predators or devices, such as mousetraps, which are not subject to the
FIFRA registration process. See BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, SPECIAL REPORT,
PESTICIDES: STATE AND FEDERAL REGULATION 9-10 (1987).
For a more complete discussion of federal pesticide regulation and its his-
tory, see Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 990-97 (1984); 2 F. GRAD,
TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW §§ 8.02-8.04 (1989); C. Bosso, PESTICIDES
AND POLITICS (1987).
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less it is registered with the EPA.' 5 Although the EPA publishes
guidelines specifying the kinds of information which will be re-
quired to support the registration,' 6 the applicant, who may be a
manufacturer or user of the product, supplies the label, claims
made for the pesticide, directions for use of the pesticide, and
results of tests to support the claims. After the Administrator re-
views the data in support of a registration, 17 FIFRA requires the
following:
The administrator shall register a pesticide if he deter-
mines that, when considered with any restrictions im-
posed under subsection (d) of this section [136a] -
(A) its composition is such as to warrant the pro-
posed claims for it;
(B) its labeling and other material required to be
submitted comply with the requirements of
this subchapter;
(C) it will perform its intended function without
unreasonable adverse effects on the environ-
ment; and
(D) when used in accordance with widespread and
commonly recognized practice it will not gener-
ally cause unreasonable adverse effects on the
environment. 18
Lack of essentiality is not a criterion for denying registration of
any pesticide, and the Administrator may register a pesticide
without determining its efficacy.' 9 FIFRA allows EPA to condi-
tionally register a pesticide containing an active ingredient not
contained in any currently registered pesticide for a period of
time sufficient to generate required data. 20 It should be noted,
however, that a consensus regarding the amount of data neces-
sary to support the safety of a conditionally-registered pesticide
15. FIFRA §§ 3(a), 12(a)(1)(A), 7 U.S.C. §§ 136a(a), 136j(a)(1)(A).
16. Id. § 3(c)(2)(A), 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(2)(A); 40 C.F.R. §§ 158.20-.740
(1989).
17. The Administrator reviews the data to determine that generally ac-
cepted procedures were used, but does not attempt to replicate the studies. 40
C.F.R. § 158.80 (1989). There have been instances in which pesticides have
been registered dispite disturbing patterns of questionable testing procedures
by registrants and testing firms hired by registrants. See, e.g., Bosso, supra note
14, at 198-200.
18. FIFRA § 3(c)(5), 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(5) (emphasis added).
19. Id.
20. Id. § 3(c)(7)(C), 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(7)(C).
1990] 359
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will be difficult to reach because human health effects and long-
term environmental effects may not become evident for years. 21
After a pesticide is registered, FIFRA provides a procedure
for cancelling or reclassifying a pesticide where there is a substan-
tial question about its safety.22 Cancellation or reclassification
proceedings may take one or two years, 23 during which the Ad-
ministrator may suspend a registration pending the outcome of
the proceedings if he determines that such suspension is neces-
sary to prevent an imminent hazard.24 "'Imminent hazard' is not
limited to a crisis: 'It is enough if there is a substantial likelihood
that serious harm will be experienced during the year or two re-
quired in any realistic projection of the administrative pro-
cess.' "25 Absent an emergency, the Administrator may not issue
a suspension order without giving registrants an opportunity to
be heard.2 6 If a registrant requests a hearing, the suspension is
stayed pending an administrative hearing.27 If an emergency ex-
ists, there is a procedure for suspension in advance of notifica-
tion, and the Administrator may issue a suspension order pending
21. More specifically, a chemical shown to be safe in one animal species
may not be safe in other species - such as humans. For example, there is disa-
greement among scientists as to the applicability of animal studies to the more
realistic exposure levels of humans. Most animal studies involve short-term ex-
posure to large amounts of a chemical, whereas human exposure may be long-
term and may involve routes of exposure not tested in animals. If there is chro-
mosomal damage in the germ cells, the effects may not show up until the next
generation. Also, effects on the environment, due to water and soil contamina-
tion, may not be evident for years after the application of the pesticide. Finally,
limited testing of the active ingredients of a pesticide may indicate adverse ef-
fects, but cannot rule out adverse effects in animals or ecological systems not
tested. For a further discussion of the considerable uncertainty about the poten-
tial for pesticides to cause chronic health effects, such as cancer and birth de-
fects, and the amount of time necessary to ascertain these effects see LAWN CARE
PESTICIDES, supra note 6.
22. FIFRA § 6(b), 7 U.S.C. § 136d(b).
23. See Love v. Thomas, 858 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied sub nom.
AFL-CIO v. Love, 109 S. Ct. 1932 (1989).
24. FIFRA § 6d(c)(1), 7 U.S.C. § 136 d(c)(1). See Love v. Thomas, 858 F.2d
1347, 1350 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied sub nom. AFL-CIO v. Love, 109 S. Ct. 1932
(1989). However, a suspension pending cancellation of proceedings is by no
means routine. See, e.g., National Coalition Against the Misuse of Pesticides v.
EPA, 867 F.2d 636 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (upholds EPA's settlement with manufac-
turer of termiticides, chlordane and heptachlor, to cancel registration of termiti-
cides, but to permit indefinitely sale and use of existing stocks outside
manufacturer's control).
25. Love, 858 F.2d at 1350 n.3 (quoting Environmental Defense Fund, Inc.
v. EPA, 465 F.2d 528, 540 (D.C. Cir. 1972), quoted in Environmental Defense
Fund, Inc. v EPA, 510 F.2d 1292, 1297 (D.C. Cir. 1975)).
26. Love, 858 F.2d at 1350 (citing FIFRA § 6(c)(1), 7 U.S.C. § 136d(c)(1)).
27. Id. at 1352 (citing FIFRA § 6(c)(2), 7 U.S.C. § 136d(c)(2)).
6
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 1, Iss. 2 [1991], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol1/iss2/1
PESTICIDE EXPOSURE
an expedited hearing.28 However, in determining whether an im-
minent hazard justifying an emergency suspension exists, the Ad-
ministrator must find that continued use would cause
unreasonable adverse effects on the environment, that is, "any
unreasonable risk to man or the environment, taking into account
the economic, social, and environmental costs and benefits of the use of
any pesticide."2 9 Thus, before issuing an emergency suspension,
the EPA must balance even persuasive evidence that use of a pes-
ticide may cause serious health risks to people exposed to it
against the economic benefits of continued use of the pesticide;30
lack of agency resources will not excuse the EPA from performing
this risk-benefit analysis. 3'
FIFRA also prohibits pesticide manufacturers and distribu-
tors from making claims in the distribution and sale of a pesticide
that differ substantially from claims made during the registration
of that pesticide.3 2 This prohibition does not provide the EPA
with enforcement authority over pesticide applicators; further-
more, a recent General Accounting Office Report concludes that
the EPA lacks the resources to bring enforcement actions against
manufacturers and distributors that make false and misleading
claims.33
The 1988 Amendments to FIFRA establish a scheme to re-
register pesticides first registered before November 1, 1984.34
Although earlier versions of FIFRA required reregistration of ex-
isting pesticides to reassess and ensure their safe use, the General
Accounting Office estimated that at the current rate, EPA would
not complete reregistration until the year 2024.3 5 Concern about
the inadequacy of data relating to currently registered pesticides
led the states and their subdivisions to assert greater control over
pesticide use. This included more stringent safeguards for work-
ers exposed to pesticides and limitations on the use of pesti-
28. FIFRA § 6(c)(3), 7 U.S.C. § 136d(c)(3).
29. Love, 858 F.2d at 1357 (quoting FIFRA § 2(bb), 7 U.S.C. § 136(bb)
(emphasis added in opinion)).
30. See Love, 858 F.2d at 1357-63.
31. Id. (reversal of Agency's suspension of use of dinoseb).
32. FIFRA § 12(a)(1)(B), 7 U.S.C. § 136j(a)(1)(B).
33. Lawn Care Pesticides, supra note 6.
34. Pub.L. 100-532, 102 Stat. 2654, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988) (codified
as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 136a-1 (1988)).
35. H.R. REP. No. 100-939, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 28-29 (1988) (quoting
UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PESTICIDES: EPA's FORMIDABLE
TASK TO ASSESS AND REGULATE THEIR RISKS (April 1986)).
1990]
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cides.36 To restore confidence in the regulatory system, the 1988
Amendments provide an accelerated registration process, which
requires EPA to conduct an independent review of a registrant's
data to determine its adequacy and to require additional data,
provided by the registrant, when existing data is deemed inade-
quate.3 7 Following completion of the review, the EPA must re-
register the pesticide or take other "appropriate regulatory ac-
tion," such as cancelling, suspending, or restricting the pesticide
or imposing label changes s38 Despite the Amendments, most
older pesticides are still on the market even though they have not
been completely reassessed.3 9
The 1988 Amendments also passed much of the costs of re-
registration on to the registrant through the imposition of regis-
tration fees.40 Other changes brought by the 1988 Amendments
included minimizing EPA's responsibility prior to the 1988
Amendments for costs of storage and disposal of suspended or
cancelled pesticides4 ' and for indemnifying current holders of
suspended or cancelled pesticides. 42
However, the basic structure of FIFRA remains unchanged.
The production of data to support a pesticide registration is con-
trolled by the registrant, and this data may be withheld from pub-
lic scrutiny as a trade secret. 43 Amendments to FIFRA in 1978
narrowed this protection by providing that "information concern-
ing the effects of such pesticide on any organism or the behavior
36. Id.
37. FIFRA § 4(a)-(g), 7 U.S.C. § 136a-l(a)-(g).
38. Id. § 4(g)(2)(D), 7 U.S.C. § 136a-l(g)(2)(D). This section does not fur-
ther define "appropriate regulatory action," but presumably refers to the regu-
latory actions mentioned above which may be taken regarding any pesticide
registered under FIFRA § 3, 7 U.S.C. § 136(a). See H.R. REP. No. 100-939,
100th Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1988).
39. For example, in LAWN CARE PESTICIDES, at 3, the GAO reports that of
the thirty-four most widely used lawn care pesticides, thirty-two are older pesti-
cides subject to reregistration, but not one of these has been completely
reassessed.
40. FIFRA § 4(i), 7 U.S.C. § 136a-1(i). See also H.R. REP. No. 100-939,
100th Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1988).
41. FIFRA § 19, 7 U.S.C. § 13 6 (q).
42. Id. § 15, 7 U.S.C. § 136m.
43. Id. § 10, 7 U.S.C. § 136h. The purpose of this provision is to prevent
the use of data submitted by one manufacturer of a pesticide by another regis-
trant to support the registration of the same or a similar product, thus, benefit-
ing from the expenditures of the company that performed the original tests. See
also FIFRA § 3(c)(1)(D), 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(1)(D). The history of these provi-
sions and litigation concerning them are discussed in Thomas v. Union Carbide
Agricultural Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568 (1985) and Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.,
467 U.S. 986 (1984).
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of such pesticide in the environment, including... data on safety
to . . . humans . . . shall be available for disclosure to the pub-
lic."'44 Despite the amendments, the public continues to experi-
ence difficulty gaining access to data regarding the health effects
of pesticides, as is illustrated by the following:
In the annals of the environmental movement, 28 June
[1982] may be recorded as a day of enormous impor-
tance. At about 4 o'clock that afternoon, representatives
of three environmental groups were admitted to a micro-
film reading room on the second floor of a federal office
building on the outskirts of Washington, D.C. They
were drawn there to examine hundreds of studies of the
environmental effect of pesticides. It was the first time
that the information had been seen by anyone outside
the chemical industry and the federal govern-
ment. . . .They [the environmentalists] had only four
days to sift through a mountain of material; nothing ex-
cept study titles could be recorded; and those present
were barred from discussing what they saw with anyone
else.4
5
FIFRA also authorizes EPA to classify pesticides where the
acute dermal or inhalation toxicity is determined to present a haz-
ard to the applicator or other persons, as restricted use pesticides
that shall be applied only by or under the direct supervision of a
certified applicator. 46 The EPA conducts certification programs
in every state, except those which have their own certification pro-
grams.47 However, most state legislation regulating pesticides is
designed to carry out EPA-approved plans.48 Many of FIFRA's
standards for EPA-approved state plans are general, e.g., requir-
ing an adequately funded state agency with legal authority and
44. Id. § 10(d)(1), 7 U.S.C. § 136h(d)(1). See 2 F. GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVI-
RONMENTAL LAw § 8.03[6] (1986).
45. Smith, A Battle over Pesticide Data, 217 SCIENCE at 515 (1982). See also
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 995-96 (health, safety and environ-
mental data available to "qualified requesters"); Comment, Pesticides: Problems
Facing the Industry in Submitting Proprietary Scientific Data to an International Organiza-
tion, 19 GA. J. INTL. & COMP. L. 195, 196 (1989).
46. FIFRA § 3(d), 7 U.S.C. § 136a(d).
47. Id. § 11, 7 U.S.C. § 136i.
48. Overviews of state pesticide laws are found in 2 F. GRAD, TREATISE ON
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 8.06 (1986); BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, SPECIAL RE-
PORT, PESTICIDES: STATE AND FEDERAL REGULATION 53-74 (1987); Redfield,
Chemical Trespass? - An Overview of Statutory and Regulatory Efforts to Control Pesticide
Drift, 73 Ky. L.J. 855 (1985).
1990] 363
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qualified personnel to carry out the plan.49 However, FIFRA is
more specific about how information regarding integrated pest
management, an approach to pest control that reduces reliance
on chemical pesticides, is handled: state plans must include pro-
visions for making instructional materials regarding integrated
pest management techniques available to individuals at their re-
quest, i.e., through cooperative state extension services. 50 The
state may not require, however, that any individual, such as a cer-
tified applicator, receive instruction concerning such techniques
or demonstrate competence with respect to the use of such tech-
niques.5' Thus, those who apply the most hazardous pesticides
may be unable to provide information to a customer regarding
less hazardous methods of pest control.
It is also worth noting other provisions of FIFRA that govern
the role of the states in pesticide regulation. States may regulate
the sale or use of any federally registered pesticide, so long as
such regulation does not permit any sale or use prohibited by
FIFRA, but states may not impose any labeling or packaging re-
quirements in addition to or different than those required under
FIFRA.52 The purpose of section 24, first added in the 1972
Amendments to FIFRA, was to permit the states to impose
stricter regulations on pesticide use than that required under the
Act, while at the same time provide uniform labeling and packag-
ing nationwide.53 There has been, however, considerable litiga-
tion over whether particular state and local regulations are
preempted by this section of FIFRA.54 The Act also permits state
registration for additional uses within the state of a federally reg-
istered pesticide to meet special local needs, so long as this state
registration does not cause violations of FIFRA or Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) tolerances. 55
49. FIFRA § Il(a)(2), 7 U.S.C. § 136i(a)(2).
50. Id. § 11(c), 7 U.S.C. § 136i(c). Integrated pest management is further
discussed infra notes 68-73 and accompanying text.
51. Id.
52. Id. § 24(a), (b), 7 U.S.C. § 136v(a), (b).
53. See Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act 1972, Pub.L.
No. 92-516, § 24, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (86 Stat.)
1139, 1168; S. REP. No. 92-838, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), reprinted in 1972
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3993, 4021. A technical amendment in the
1988 Amendments subtitled the preemption provision in FIFRA section 24(b), 7
U.S.C. § 136v(b), with the word "uniformity." See also FIFRA Amendments,
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-532, § 801(m)(2), reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS (102 Stat.) 2654, 2682.
54. This litigation is discussed infra notes 247-62 and accompanying text.
55. FIFRA § 24(c), 7 U.S.C. § 136v(c).
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In summary, most information regarding pesticides is ini-
tially developed by the registrant, who is not necessarily required
to demonstrate the efficacy of the pesticide, and this information
may be barred from public view. Older pesticides are subject to
reregistration under the same scheme, and new pesticides may be
conditionally registered, but they continue to reach the market
even though adequate data to support the registration has not yet
been developed. 56 Even when concerns about the safety of a pes-
ticide emerge, cancelling or suspending its sale and use is not a
simple matter. Cancellation may take two years, and suspension
of registration shifts the burden to the EPA, an agency with lim-
ited resources, to show that continued use of the pesticide poses
risks to humans and the environment and that such risks outweigh
the benefits of continued use. The government may pay some of
the costs of recalling a pesticide where registration has been can-
celled constituting another disincentive to cancellation.
FIFRA also does not discourage unnecessary pesticide use.
Some pesticides are registered for restricted use, and these pesti-
cides may be applied only by certified applicators who may have
no knowledge of less hazardous pest control alternatives. State
and local government efforts to restrict pesticide use to protect
the public health have been successfully challenged in some
instances. 57
B. Overuse of Pesticides
Given FIFRA's structure, one may legitimately question
whether pesticides currently registered are needed, and whether
they pose health risks that those who apply pesticides and are ex-
posed to applied pesticides might find unacceptable if more infor-
mation were known.58 Indeed, information developed in the
56. Bosso, supra note 14, at 200-02.
57. See infra notes 281-82 and accompanying text.
58. Courts have held that for purposes of assessing the environmental im-
pact of a proposed major federal action, such as a herbicide spray program on
federal lands, under the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-
4370b (1988) [hereinafter NEPAl, the registration process for herbicides under
FIFRA is inadequate to address NEPA environmental concerns and therefore
reliance on that registration process alone is improper. Save Our Ecosystems v.
Clark, 747 F.2d 1240, 1248 (9th Cir. 1984). See also Citizens for Non-Toxic Pest
Control v. California Dep't of Food & Agriculture, 187 Cal. App. 3d 1575, 1587,
232 Cal. Rptr. 729, 735 (1986) (Department of Food and Agriculture required
to prepare environmental impact report under state Environmental Quality Act
before implementing fruit fly eradication project). Cf Northwest Coalition for
Alternatives to Pesticides v. Lyng, 673 F. Supp. 1019, 1025 (D. Or. 1987), aff'd.
844 F.2d 588 (9th Cir. 1988) (reliance on EPA data appropriate).
1990] 365
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scientific community indicates that pesticides have adverse effects
beyond those on the target organisms they are intended to con-
trol. 59 Pesticides applied in accordance with widespread and
commonly recognized practice frequently enter non-target areas,
and agricultural workers wearing so-called protective clothing
may still absorb high levels of the pesticides they are applying.60
Some researchers have found that of the total amount of pesti-
cides applied in the United States, less than 0.1% of those applied
to crops actually reaches the target pest.61 The remainder enters
non-target areas by wind drift, evaporation and movement on air
currents, runoff into streams and lakes, leaching into soil and
groundwater, and water erosion. 62 There is growing recognition
that pesticides can and do enter the groundwater and contami-
nate the nation's drinking water supply.63 Persistent pesticides
intended to resist degradation and provide long-lasting protec-
tion may move through the food chain and accumulate in humans
who consume treated produce and products from animals that
consume treated feed.6 The general public is becoming con-
cerned with the threat of injury associated with the consumption
of pesticides in food, as shown by the extensive popular press
coverage of the use of Alar on apples. 65 However, the threat that
59. See infra note 95 and accompanying text.
60. See, e.g., Pestiides May Penetrate Protective Clothes, 4 NEW SCIENTIST, April
19, 1984, at 4.
61. D. Pimental & L. Levitan, Pesticides: Amounts Applied and Amounts Reaching
Pests, 36 BIOSCIENCE no. 2, Feb. 1986, at 86.
62. See, e.g., OFFICE OF PESTICIDES PROGRAMS, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PRO-
TECTION AGENCY, APPLY PESTICIDES CORRECTLY 83-84 (1980); H.R. REP. No.
100-939, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 26 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3474.
63. See Zaki, Moran & Harris, Pesticides in Groundwater: The Aldicurb Story in
Suffolk County, NY, 72 AMERICAN J. PUBLIC HEALTH 1391 (1982); Rajput, Uitti,
Stem, Laverty, O'Donnell, O'Donnell, Yuen & Dua, Geography, Drinking Water
Chemistry, Pesticides and Herbicides and the Etiology of Parkinson's Disease, 14 CANADAJ.
NEUROL. Sci. 414 (1987); Mestres, Spiliopoulos, Mestres & Cooper, Transport of
Organic Contaminants in Groundwater Gas Chromatography Model to Forcast the Signifi-
cance as Applied to Aldicurb Sulfone Residues, 16 ARCH. ENVTL. CONTAM. TOXICOL.
649 (1987); Grumbles, Pesticides in Groundwater and CERCLA Section 106, 19 Env't
Rep. (BNA) 281 (June 24, 1988); Cohen, Pesticides in Groundwater, New Hamp-
shire Turf Talk Newsletter, Winter 1986-87, at 18; Knudson, Experts Say Chemicals
Peril Farm Belt's Water, N.Y. Times, Sept. 6, 1986, at 8; UNITED STATES ENVTL.
PROTECTION AGENCY, PROPOSED AGRICULTURAL CHEMICALS IN GROUND WATER
STRATEGIC PLAN (1987).
64. See, e.g., 2 F. GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 8.01 (1986); R.
CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962); B. WARD & R. DUBOS, ONLY ONE EARTH at 40
(1972).
65. See, e.g., Gilbert, America Tackles the Pesticide Crisis, N.Y. Times, Oct. 8,
1989, (Magazine, Part II), at 25.
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pesticides pose to the health of people involved in the manufac-
ture, transportation, application, and cleanup of pesticides is
probably not as well recognized, nor is the exposure related to
drift of pesticides sprayed over agricultural areas.
As revealed in recent Congressional hearings on risks associ-
ated with lawn care pesticides, this lack of awareness may result
from the pesticide industry's promotion of their products as
"safe" and "practically non-toxic," which are believed by a public
that assumes that EPA-registered pesticides are safe.66 However,
the long-term effects of some pesticides are documented in the
scientific and medical literature. The discussion in Part II will ac-
quaint the reader with these effects.
Moreover, it is becoming questionable whether overwhelm-
ing benefits justify the risks associated with pesticide use. As
pests develop resistances to synthetic pesticides, increasing
amounts of those substances are used, even though most do not
hit the intended target. Furthermore, it is doubtful that this in-
creased pesticide use enhances productivity. One study notes
that despite the vast growth of synthetic pesticides since the
1940's, annual crop losses to all categories of pests as a percent-
age of total potential crops appear not to have declined. 67 Where
pest control is necessary to avoid crop loss, alternatives to syn-
thetic pesticides exist.
Organic farming, which uses no nonorganic fertilizers, insec-
ticides or herbicides to aid in farming, but rather relies on natural
fertilizers and pest control agents, is growing in popularity. 68 An-
other alternative, integrated pest management (IPM), "strives for
maximum use of natural controls over pest populations.., and
enhances these natural elements with techniques such as soil till-
66. See The Use and Regulation of Lawn Chemicals: Hearings before Subcomm. on
Toxic Substances, Environmental Oversight, Research and Development of the Senate Comm.
on Environment and Public Works, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990); See also LAWN CARE
PESTICIDES, supra note 6.
67. 2 F. GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 8.01 (1986) (citing
COUNCIL OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, NINTH ANNUAL
REPORT at 278 (1978)). One researcher estimates that from the 1940's to the
197 0's, crop losses to insects have doubled despite tenfold increases in pesticide
use. L. MoTr & K. SNYDER, PESTICIDE ALERT 7 (1987) (citing Pimental, Benefits
and Costs of Pesticide Use in U.S. Food Production, 28 Bio SCIENCE, Dec. 1978, at 772-
84).
68. Gilbert, American Tackles the Pesticide Crisis, N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1989,
(Magazine, Part II), at 25. Gilbert estimated that the number of organic farms in
California doubled in 1989 and numbered 1500. It should be noted that stan-
dards for organic farming are not uniform nationwide. A summary of one
group's organic farming standards is set forth in Langan v. Valicopters, Inc., 88
Wash. 2d 855, 567 P.2d 218 (1977).
1990]
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age, crop rotation and pest-resistent crop and livestock vari-
eties." 69  IPM uses only very limited amounts of synthetic
pesticides.70 Through adoption of IPM techniques, insecticide
use by Texas cotton farmers decreased by 88% between 1966 and
1974; sweet corn growers in Connecticut cut insecticide con-
sumption by up to 50%. 7 1 Studies have projected that a national
commitment to IPM could reduce pesticide applications by 70%
to 80% with no cost in crop yields. 72 Other approaches, such as
sustainable agriculture, that seek to promote agricultural produc-
tivity and its economic viability without compromising environ-
mental quality and the quality of life of farmers, are also being
developed. 73
II. PESTICIDE-RELATED INJURY IN HUMANS
A. General Problems of Health Effects Studies
This discussion focuses on the health effects of direct expo-
sure to pesticides. 74 It should be noted that any study of such
health effects is complicated by the synergistic effects of pesticides
combined with other substances, but such effects will not be ad-
dressed here. 75 Also, some individuals are more sensitive to pes-
ticides and suffer problems not experienced by most people
69. 2 F. GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAw § 8.03, at 8-13 - 8-14
(1986) (quoting COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL QUAL-
rrY, NINTH ANNUAL REPORT at 278 (1978)). See also Day, Integrated Pest Manage-
ment: Towards Greening of American Pesticide Policy, 8 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 93
(1989).
70. Id.
71. L. MoTr & K. SNYDER, PESTICIDE ALERT 46 (1987).
72. Id.
73. See Hamilton, Sustainable Agriculture: The Role of the Attorney, 20 Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,021 (Jan. 1990). See also Baker, Pest Control in the Public
Interest, 8 UCLAJ. ENVrL. L. & POLICY 31 (1988) (use of pest control districts as
means of pest control).
74. The health effects of drinking pesticide-contaminated groundwater are
discussed elsewhere, see supra note 63 and accompanying text.
75. For example, "inert ingredients" are often mixed with the active pesti-
cide ingredients. These inert ingredients are generally well-known and studied
chemicals. However, the combination of a pesticide with an inert ingredient
may affect the ability of the pesticide component to enter the body, and may also
affect the way the pesticide is metabolized in the body. Although such "syner-
gistic" effects are important to the overall understanding of pesticide health ef-
fects, very little information is available.
Other synergistic effects beyond the scope of this article involve the simulta-
neous use of pesticides and tobacco. It is known that tobacco use alone is associ-
ated with higher disease risk. Tobacco use, however, may cause pesticides to
have a greater health risk than they would have in a person who is not a tobacco
user.
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under similar circumstances, however, particular susceptibility is
also outside the scope of this article. 76
Several observations are necessary to understand fully the
studies of the health effects associated with pesticide exposure.
Most of the studies linking pesticide exposure to illness in
humans are based upon statistical studies of exposed and unex-
posed populations. However, such studies do not prove that a
particular individual in the exposed population contracted a spe-
cific illness as a result of pesticide exposure. Most, if not all, of
the pesticide-related diseases can also have other causes.
Cancer and other long-term diseases arise at the sub-cellular
level and manifest themselves at a clinical level only when they
have progressed to a point where tissue damage or tissue changes
are detectable. Even with the most sophisticated knowledge and
technology, a scientist cannot prove that exposure to a chemical
"caused" cancer in a particular patient. When scientists refer to
causation, they are speaking in terms of correlations: reproduc-
ibility and predictability of experimental results.
To illustrate, if 100 mice are exposed to a chemical and 100
other mice, the control group, are not exposed, the number of
exposed mice having tumors above the number of control group
tumors represents the number of tumors "caused" by the chemi-
cal. Because there is usually a background level of tumors, it can-
not be determined which individual mice have the chemically
induced tumors and which have the background tumors. Causa-
tion is strengthened by repetition of this type of work in other
laboratories because repetition decreases the possibility that
something other than the chemical caused the tumors.
Sometimes the tumor incidence over background level is so
high, or the background level is so low, that scientists agree that
exposure to the chemical caused the tumor.77 However, in most
cases, it is difficult to conclude that exposure to a suspected toxic
agent was the cause of a particular disease. 78
76. In the context of pesticide poisoning, this issue is certainly not well de-
veloped because the factors that would increase sensitivity to a pesticide are only
beginning to be understood. See infra notes 81-82 and accompanying text. [ask
author]
77. A human example is the type of cancer known as angiosarcoma of the
liver. The background level of this tumor is so low that if a patient with this
disease is known to have been exposed to high levels of vinyl chloride, scientists
agree that vinyl chloride is the cause of the tumor.
78. By analogy, if in animal experiments there were ten incidences of tu-
mors in the control mice and twelve in the treated group (out of 100 mice in
each group), the increase may be statistically insignificant. In this case it might
1990] 369
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Some scientists believe that chemical carcinogenesis is
caused by a reaction between a chemical and the DNA of a cell,79
although other scientists believe that cancer may arise from chem-
ical alteration of other cellular components. Thus, valuable infor-
mation might result from studies in which chemicals are tested for
their ability to cause chemical changes in DNA in test tubes in
addition to studying populations. However, these in vitro, or test
tube, studies are not directly applicable to whether these chemi-
cals cause cancer in animals and humans.8 0
These in vitro results must be corroborated by in vivo -
animal - tests. The scientific community is divided, however, as
to the applicability of these results in regard to exposure and dis-
ease in humans.8 '
be concluded that the treatment was not carcinogenic. For this reason large
numbers of animals must be treated with a wide range of doses of the agent.
Causation is more conclusive where the level of tumors increases with the doses
of the chemical given to the treated group.
79. These scientists believe that exposure to a carcinogenic chemical alters
the genetic code of the cell, contained in the DNA, and after several cell divi-
sions the alteration is manifested by the development of cancer cells. Five basic
categories of DNA damage that have consequences in humans have been de-
scribed as follows: (1) gene mutations, (2) chromosomal rearrangements, (3)
abnormal number of chromosomes, (4) mitotic rearrangement, and (5) stimula-
tion of unscheduled DNA synthesis and inhibition of DNA repair. de Serres,
Evaluation of Tests for Mutagenicity as Indicators of Environmental Mutagens and Carcin-
ogens, 329 ANN. N.Y. AcAD. Sci. 76 (1979).
80. When a human is exposed to a carcinogen, the chemical must pass sev-
eral "barriers" before it interacts with the DNA of the cell. By the time it en-
counters the DNA, if ever, it may have been converted to a harmless chemical.
Thus, the ability of a chemical to alter DNA in a test tube could incorrectly pre-
dict carcinogenicity. The converse is also true: a "safe" chemical tested in a test
tube might be converted to a carcinogen by enzymes in human cells and tissues.
81. According to one author, "there is clear historic evidence that if a
chemical is carcinogenic in appropriate animal test systems, it must be treated as
if it were carcinogenic in man." Rall, Validity of Extrapolation of Results in Animal
Studies to Man, 329 ANN. N.Y. AcAD. Sci. 85 (1979). However, scientists, accus-
tomed to testing a hypothesis before drawing a conclusion based on limited test
results, are often reluctant to predict what a chemical will do in humans based
upon limited animal experiments. Id. at 86.
Bruce Ames has argued that animal tests are of limited value in predicting
absolute human risk. Ames, Magaw & Gold, Ranking Possible Carcinogenic Hazards,
236 SCIENCE 271 (1987). Of 226 chemicals that are carcinogenic in rodents, 96
were carcinogenic in either rats or mice. Id. at 275. According to Ames:
This discordance occurs despite the fact that rats and mice are very
closely related and have short life spans. Qualitative extrapolation of
cancer risks from rats or mice to humans, a very dissimilar, long-lived
species, is unlikely to be as reliable. Conversely, important human car-
cinogens may not be detected in standard tests in rodents; this was true
for a long time for both tobacco smoke and alcohol, the two largest
identified causes of neoplastic [cancer] death in the United States.
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There have been attempts to provide guidelines for the kind
of animal tests that can be used to establish causation in humans.
Some criteria that have been suggested are as follows:
1. Whether the animals were tested in accordance with cor-
rect EPA laboratory guidelines, such as housing control group an-
imals in a different location than animals receiving toxic
substances.
2. The length of the study: cancer predictions, which are re-
lated more to chronic toxicity than to acute toxicity, may not be
valid if the doses given to the animals were very large and were
given over a short period of time.
3. Whether the pathologist's finding of cancer was based on
the view that the cellular changes were merely neoplastic, i.e.
changes in cell shape, or whether malignancy or metastasis were
also present.
4. Whether the sample size (number of animals) was ade-
quate to permit valid statistical inferences.
5. Whether the type of animal used was subject to recog-
nized or unusual tumor tendencies. 82
As the foregoing discussion illustrates, science can provide a
variety of methods for determining whether a chemical can cause
DNA damage, or whether exposure to the chemical increases inci-
dence of a specific disease in laboratory animals. It is more diffi-
cult to apply these data to incidents of human pesticide exposure
and to determine that a particular individual's symptoms were
caused by pesticide exposure.
Despite this uncertainty, a physician seeing one patient with
symptoms of acute chemical exposure may have little hesitation in
finding that a particular chemical caused the symptoms if (a) there
is evidence of exposure to the chemical and (b) the known effects
of the chemical are consistent with the symptoms. If there is little
information about the particular chemical to which the patient has
been exposed, a physician might look to information about other
chemicals that are in the family of chemicals to which the particu-
lar chemical belongs and that are already known to cause disease.
In fact, many common pesticides belong to chemical groups
which have been extensively studied in terms of their effect on
animal and human physiology.
82. NOTHSTEIN, Toxic TORTS 439-74 (1984).
1990]
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B. Pesticides Grouped According to Chemical Structure
Pesticides are used in the workplace, on farms, in green-
houses, in the home, and in the garden. Exposure can result from
accidental spillage or routine long-term use. Children may be at
risk of disease or birth defects as a result of chromosomal damage
in parents exposed to pesticides.
The effects of pesticides on humans depends upon the chem-
ical structure of the pesticide, the "inert" ingredients of the pesti-
cide preparation, the route of exposure (dermal, inhalation, etc.),
the duration of exposure, and the presence of "synergistic" fac-
tors such as tobacco use. In addition, pesticides as a group vary
widely in their capacity to damage cells and tissues in a human.
For example, dibromochloropropane is a gonadotoxin which
causes decreased spermatogenesis in exposed workers. Paraquat
has been linked to Parkinson's disease (although this link is dis-
puted in the medical community). Chlordecone can cause neuro-
logical disturbances in exposed manufacturing personnel.
Organophosphates such as parathion, a substitute for DDT, in-
hibit cholinesterase in the nervous system, leading ultimately to
paralysis and death in cases of extreme exposure. Some pesti-
cides cause chromosomal damage in humans which may poten-
tially affect the germ cells and offspring of the exposed persons.
Pesticides can be classified into groups based upon their
chemical structure.
1. Bipyridils. These chemical compounds are used as her-
bicides. Bipyridils are suspected to cause changes in cellular me-
tabolism and to damage cell membranes. As these effects are
general, damage to a variety of cells and tissues in the body can
occur.
These chemicals cause a variety of symptoms, including skin
irritation, dehydration, hemorrhage, and liver, kidney and lung
damage. Death can result due to kidney failure or pulmonary
damage. The most well-known bipyridyl is paraquat.
2. Carbamates. These chemicals have many uses, including
use as fungicides, herbicides, and insecticides. Acute exposure
can cause abdominal cramps, eye damage, respiratory damage
and a variety of other symptoms. Chronic exposure can lead to
anorexia, cholinesterase depression, muscle weakness and renal
damage. Suspected effects of individual carbamates include mu-
tagenic effects (Aldicarb, Carbofuran), carcinogenesis and im-
mune suppression (Carbaryl).
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Carbamates cause acetylcholine to accumulate due to an inhi-
bition of acetylcholinesterase. This accumulation impairs central
nervous system function. However, the effect disappears and the
enzyme activity returns to normal after a few hours. As the en-
zyme is also affected in red blood cells, overexposure to carba-
mates can be detected using a blood test.
3. Chlorophenoxys. These chemicals are used as herbi-
cides. Chlorophenoxys have a variety of effects both inside and
outside the cell. Important biochemical reactions within the cell
are affected by the chemicals and may result in demyelination of
nerves and skeletal muscle damage.
These cellular effects are manifested acutely as anorexia, cen-
tral nervous system damage, liver damage, respiratory difficulty,
and eventually death due to peripheral vascular collapse. The
chronic effects include skin disease, neuritis, and paralysis. The
most well-known chemical of this group is 2,4-D which is also sus-
pected of causing cancer and prenatal damage.
4. Organochlorines. These chemicals have several uses, in-
cluding insecticidal use, and adversely affect the human nervous
system. Individual chemicals in this class also have other effects.
Aldrin is a suspected carcinogen and has effects on the repro-
ductive system. Chlordane has a variety of effects on blood cells,
on the reproductive system and the developing fetus and is a car-
cinogen and mutagen. Endrin also causes prenatal damage and is
a mutagen.
Aldrin and dieldrin are listed as cancelled pesticides in the
United States as of 1974. Endrin was cancelled in 1979. In each
case, oncogenesis was listed as one reason for the cancellation.
Because of their chemical structure, these pesticides can be stored
in human fat for extended periods of time. DDT is another mem-
ber of this pesticide group.
5. Organophosphates. These chemicals are used as pesti-
cides and herbicides. Organophosphates are also acetylcholines-
terase inhibitors and can impair central nervous system function.
Individual members of this large group also have other effects.
For example, Parathion may be a carcinogen and may cause pre-
natal damage.
C. Medical Evidence of Pesticide-Related Illness
Much of the evidence linking pesticide exposure to disease
consists of isolated reports in the medical literature. Sadly, some
1990] 373
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of these reports deal with self-induced pesticide poisoning in sui-
cide attempts - many of which were successful.83 However,
there have also been several systematic studies of large groups of
individuals affected through routine or accidental exposure at
their place of employment or residence. Together, these kinds of
reports provide very convincing evidence that pesticide exposure
can and does cause both acute and chronic damage to human
health.
D. Illness in Farm Workers
Much of the data regarding pesticide exposure of farm work-
ers comes from countries where pesticide regulation is still at an
early stage or is virtually non-existent. Often the farmers using
the pesticides are, for economic reasons, more concerned about
the immediate yield of crops than with the long-term effects of
pesticide use. Furthermore, even if protective clothing and masks
were available to applicators, in many of these countries the high
heat and humidity would virtually preclude the use of adequate
covering by applicators and farmers.
In rice-growing areas of the Philippines, a documented in-
crease in male mortality has been associated with the widespread
adoption of insecticides by farmers. Unfortunately, use of pesti-
cides in this and in other comparable areas is often unregulated,
and unsafe practices are common. According to one study:
[A] person applying endrin with a backpack sprayer in
good repair and under typical conditions would be ex-
pected to come into direct contact with 41 mg of active
ingredient per hour. At that rate, a 55 kg worker would
be exposed, on the parts of the body generally left un-
covered, to a third of the rodent LD50 in treating an aver-
age holding of 2.5 hectare once. This estimate excludes
exposure during handling of the concentrate in
mixing.8 4
This Philippine study examined farm use of several insecti-
cides including carbofuran, endrin, parathion and mono-
83. Kancir, 26 CLINIcAL ToxiCOL. 257-64 (1988); Shemesh, Bourvin, Gold
& Brocha, Survival After Acute Endosulfan Intoxication, 26 CLINICAL TOXICOL. 265-
68 (1988).
84. Loevinsohn, Insecticide Use and Increased Mortality in Rural Central Luzon,
Philippines, LANCET June 13, 1987, 1359-62. LDs0 refers to the amount of a sub-
stance which will kill 50% of exposed laboratory animals in a specific period of
time.
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crotophos. The mortality in four areas was analyzed for a period
of low pesticide use (1961-1971) and high pesticide use (1972-
1984).
In men, mortality attributed to non-traumatic causes was
27% higher in 1972-1984 than in 1961-1971. Mortality attrib-
uted to leukemia increased 480%. No deaths from stroke in men
of 15-24 years of age were recorded before 1972. Twenty such
deaths were recorded from 1972-1982.
The types of diseases indicated by the study are highly sug-
gestive of pesticide exposure. Cyclodiene and hexachloro-
cyclohexane insecticides cause symptoms that are often
misdiagnosed as stroke; this may account for the rise in deaths
attributed to stroke among men of 15-24 years of age, an age
group rarely affected by stroke.
Leukemia is a disease that has many suspected causes, one of
which is exposure to pesticides. The large increase in the leuke-
mia rate following widespread pesticide use suggests pesticide ex-
posure as at least one factor.
Hematological disorders have also been reported among ag-
ricultural workers in Brazil. A 1984 report attributed 56% of
cases of bone marrow aplasia observed in an agricultural area
near Sao Paulo to pesticides and herbicides.8 5
Some individual case studies illustrate the severity of the
problems:
A 17-year-old female employed at a tomato plantation
where several organochlorides were used presented with
a one month history of anaemia. Her sister had died 1
year earlier of bone marrow aplasia... She was treated
with oxymetholone and prednisone, and her marrow
function improved. 1 year later, only thrombocytopenia
persists. She left the farm where she used to live and
moved into town.
A 12-year-old girl was working in a cotton field when
pesticide was sprayed from an aeroplane. 1 month
later... [b]one marrow showed chiefly fat tissue and a
few hemopoietic cells. She was treated with ox-
ymetholone and prednisone... She died 5 months later.
A 42-two-year-old man was exposed to an organochlo-
ride when a spray pump exploded (in an accident in
85. Lorand, Souza & Costu, Haematological Toxicity Associated with Agricultural
Chemicals in Brazil, LANCET Feb. 18, 1984, 404.
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which three colleagues died from acute intoxica-
tion).. .Pancytopenia and monocytoid cells persisted pe-
ripherally for 11 months, at which time acute
myelogenous leukemia was diagnosed. He died of over-
whelming infection before chemotherapy could be
started. 6
In 1988, Rupa et al. demonstrated a correlation between pes-
ticide use and chromosomal aberrations in male garden workers.
Some chromosome damage was attributable to cigarette smoking,
but even accounting for this there was an increase in chromo-
somal damage associated with pesticide exposure. The authors
concluded in pertinent part:
In the present study, people occupationally exposed
to pesticides showed an increase in chromosomal aberra-
tions .... The workers in the present study were pesti-
cide sprayers and each worker handled DDT, BHC,
malathion, parathion, dimethoate, fenitrothion, urea and
gromor on different days and would normally spray
these pesticides for eight hours per day, being directly
exposed to pesticides without taking any precautionary
measures and smoking while spraying.8 7
Chromosomal aberrations were also noted in a population of
floriculturists in Argentina. These workers were involved with
greenhouse production of chrysanthemums, carnations and
roses, and used organophosphorus and carbamate-type pesticides
simultaneously.
Some greenhouse workers exhibited symptoms of chronic
pesticide intoxication: fatigue, numbness in upper and lower
limbs, muscle weakness and pain in limbs, leg cramps and abdom-
inal pain. Chromosomal damage was present in these workers
and in workers who did not have symptoms of exposure.
The following summary gives an indication of the extent to
which these workers and their families were routinely exposed to
the pesticides:
Under the working conditions described, all the
86. Id.
87. Rupa, Rita, Reddy & Reddi, Screening of Chromosomal Aberrations and Sister
Chromatid Exchanges in Peripheral Lymphocytes of Vegetable Garden Works, 7 HUMAN
ToxicOL. 333-36 (1988).
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people belonging to the community of La Capilla must
be considered as exposed to pesticides due to:
(1) the proximity of green houses to homes and the in-
volvement of all the family members in agricultural
activities;
(2) the plastic greenhouses being without proper venti-
lation, where pesticides remain for a long time after
spraying as aerosols, on plants or tools, contacting not
only sprayers but also people working after application
of the products;
(3) the lack of protective measures: due to the high
temperature in the green houses in the summer, no pro-
tective clothes are used and people can contact pesti-
cides by skin, breathing or ingestion;
(4) the inadequate storage of chemicals which includes
storage at home;
(5) the use of large amounts of pesticides due to the
intensive production activity.88
Takahashi et al. 89 reported that agricultural workers exposed
to the pesticides dibromochloropropane and ethylene dibromide
exhibited depressed sperm counts as compared with a control
population. This study was undertaken on the'island of Molokai,
Hawaii, where extensive pineapple production entails the use of
these pesticides. The results were consistent with previous re-
ports of gonadotoxic effects of dibromochloropropane in workers
in chemical production plants. 9°
An increase in cancer incidence has been documented in pes-
ticide applicators in Florida. There was an increase in the
number of deaths from brain cancer, lung cancer and acute mye-
loid leukemia. Although the presence of disease could not be
correlated with a particular pesticide, the risk of lung cancer in-
creased with the number of years of exposure to pesticides, sug-
88. Dulout, Pastori, Olivero, Cid, Loria, Matos, Sobel, Bujan & Albiuno,
Sister-Chromatid Exchanges and Chromosomal Aberrations in a Population Exposed to Pes-
ticides, 143 MUTATION RESEARCH 237-44 (1985).
89. Takahashi, Wong, Rogers & Hale, Depression of Sperm Counts Among Agri-
cultural Workers Exposed to Dibromochloropropane and Ethylene Dibromide, 27 BULL.
ENVrh. CoNTAm. TOxiCOL. 551-58 (1981).
90. Lipshultz, Ross, Whorton, Milby, Smith & Joyner, Dibromochloropropane
and its Effect on Testicular Function in Man, 124 J. UROLOGY 464 (1980); Marshall,
Whorton, Krauss & Palmer, Effect of Pesticides on Testicular Function, 11 UROLOGY
257 (1978); Whorton, Milby, Krauss & Stubbs, Testicular Function in DBCP Exposed
Pesticide Workers, 21 J. Occup. MED. 161 (1979).
1990] 377
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gesting that pesticides, not other factors, were responsible. 9 1
California requires medical surveillance of agricultural work-
ers, including measurements of cholinesterase activity in plasma
and red blood cells. A decrease in activity over time indicates ex-
posure to organophosphate and carbamate compounds. The ef-
fects of these pesticides on nerve cell transmission correlates well
with their effects on cholinesterase activity in red blood cells;
therefore, a blood test can predict neurological effects. Workers
whose red blood cells show a decrease in cholinesterase activity
are monitored and in some cases must avoid exposure to pesti-
cides until the enzyme levels return to normal. 92 A link between
pesticide exposure and Parkinsonism has been demonstrated
among farmers and grain-storage workers. 93
Reports such as those discussed above have not gone unno-
ticed by the United States medical establishment. In 1988, the
Council of Scientific Affairs of the American Medical Association
published a report entitled Cancer Risk of Pesticides in Agricul-
tural Workers. 94 The report relates to a resolution passed by the
American Medical Association (AMA) Board of Trustees calling
for the AMA to alert physicians to the potential hazards of agri-
cultural pesticides, to provide physicians with advice on these
hazards for their patients, and to urge the appropriate labeling of
these substances.
The report points out that only two pesticides - arsenic and
vinyl chloride - have been definitely shown to be carcinogenic in
humans. However, the report acknowledges the numerous stud-
ies that suggest correlations between elevated incidence of cancer
and pesticide exposure in specific groups of people. The report
concludes that much information needs to be gathered before the
carcinogenic effects of other pesticides can be ruled out.
As the medical studies discussed above make clear, agricul-
91. Blair, Granman, Lubin & Fraumeni, Lung Cancer and Other Causes of Death
Among Licensed Pesticide Applicators, 71 J. NATL. CAN. INST. 31-37 (1983).
92. Coye, Lowe, & Maddy, Biological Monitoring of Agricultural Workers Exposed
to Pesticides: I Cholinesterase Activity Determinations, 28 J. Occ. MED. 617-27 (1986).
The effects of cholinesterase have been known for years. According to a 1953
report, adaptation to cholinesterase inhibitors can occur after long-term expo-
sure to organic phosphorus insecticides. See Sumerford, Hayes, Johnston,
Walker & Spillane, Cholinesterase Response and Symptomatology from Exposure to Or-
ganic Phosphorus Insecticides, 7 A.M.A. ARCH. IND. HYG. OccuP. MED. 383-98
(1953).
93. Peters, 59 ACTA PHARM. ToxiCOL. 535-46 (1986); Chapman, Peters,
Matthews & Levine, Parkinsonism and Industrial Chemicals, LANCET Feb. 7, 1987,
333.
94. Council of Scientific Affairs, 260 J. AMER. MED. Assoc. 959-66 (1988).
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tural workers and others are often exposed to a variety of pesti-
cides, simultaneously or sequentially, over a period of time. It
will take many years of study before specific diseases and symp-
toms in one individual can be attributed to exposure to an identi-
fiable pesticide or one of its components.
E. Other Agriculture-Related Illnesses Related to Pesticide
Exposure
As was mentioned in Part I, a large proportion of applied
pesticides do not reach or stay on the target for which they are
intended. In view of this, studies have been conducted to deter-
mine if people living or working near sites of pesticide use are
affected by exposure to the chemicals. In addition, information is
available through reports from hospitals which have treated vic-
tims of exposure.
In 1987, Goldman et al.95 reported that four episodes of ill-
ness in a farming community were associated with treatment of
strawberry fields with the fumigants methyl bromide and chloro-
picrin. These chemicals are routinely added to soil before plant-
ing to control nematodes, insects, weeds and fungi. The treated
ground is covered temporarily with a tarp, but some of the fumi-
gants can escape into the air.
On separate occasions, low wind velocity coupled with high
temperatures led to an increase in the air concentration of the
fumigants. Residents living up to one-half mile from the site had
to be treated for eye irritations, sore throats, headache, and in
one child, hallucination. The location of the affected residents
was consistent with the direction of the wind relative to the
treated fields.
Apart from the irritating acute effects, methyl bromide is sus-
pected of neurotoxic, carcinogenic, and teratogenic effects. The
chronic effects of the other fumigant, chloropicrin, are unknown.
Although the number of people exposed in the incidents dis-
cussed above is not large, a follow-up study of their medical con-
ditions might yield additional information about subsequent
effects of exposure to these fumigants.
The foregoing discussion only touches upon the effects of
pesticides on individuals who handle and work with the chemicals
and who are exposed to pesticides during and after application.
95. Goldman, Mengle, Epstein, Fredson, Kelly & Jackson, Acute Symptom in
Persons Residing Near a Field Treated with the Soil Fumigants Methyl Bromide and Chloro-
picin, 147 WESTERNJ. MED. 95-98 (1987).
1990] 379
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The medical community is faced with the challenge of identifying,
treating, and helping to prevent pesticide-associated illness and
death. Also, as will be discussed below, the legal community has
both the challenge and the opportunity to fashion effective ways
of compensating victims of pesticide exposure and to help pre-
vent future episodes of exposure.
III. LEGAL PROTECTION FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS
VERSUS PROTECTION ACCORDED INDIVIDUALS
EXPOSED TO PESTICIDES AT TIME OF
APPLICATION
Recovery for exposure to pesticides is not unknown in the
common law. Indeed, courts have been quite generous in award-
ing recovery to individuals who have suffered property damage
caused by pesticide exposure and who have suffered acute per-
sonal injury shortly after an excessive dose of pesticides or
drenching. Courts have had considerable difficulty, however, in
providing remedies to individuals who have long-term, low-level
exposures.
A. Recovery for Property Damage
1. Rights Against Neighboring Landowners and
Applicators
For over fifty years, courts have recognized a landowner's
right to apply pesticides to protect interests in land. This right,
however, is qualified by the rights of neighboring landowners to
be safe from unreasonable harm. In Bennett v. Larsen Co.,96 the
court described these competing rights as follows:
At common law, the landowner has the right to make use
of the land as he or she sees fit. This privilege, however,
is qualified by due regard for the interest of others who
may be affected by the landowner's activities on the
property. Thus, the landowner or possessor is under an
obligation to make reasonable use of the property so
that no unreasonable harm is caused to others in the vi-
cinity .... Thus, the landowner or possessor could take
reasonable steps to protect growing crops by spraying
insecticides but had to exercise reasonable care to en-
sure that the pesticides were not sprayed on or did not
96. 118 Wis. 2d 681, 348 N.W.2d 540 (1984).
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drift onto others' property. If pesticides were over-
sprayed or drifted onto adjacent properties, the pesti-
cide user could be held liable for any resulting
damages. 97
Thus, courts have recognized an individual's right to recover for
property damage caused by overspraying or spray drift from the
application of pesticides on adjacent property. The usual theory
of recovery is negligence, although some courts have recognized
some variant of strict liability in cases of pesticide-caused prop-
erty damage.
a. Negligence Standard
The most common standard of liability is negligence. From
the cases allowing recovery on a negligence theory, three related
aspects to a successful claim can be gleaned: the plaintiff must
prove that (1) the negligent application of pesticides on neighbor-
ing land (2) was the cause of (3) crop or animal loss suffered by
the plaintiff.98 Both the applicator and the landowner may be
liable.
(1) Standard of Care
A typical case discussing the type of act resulting in negli-
gence liability is Wieting v. Ball Air Spray, Inc.99 In Wieting, the
plaintiffs claimed that their trees and gardens were damaged
when defendant negligently sprayed 2,4-D, a herbicide that kills
not only undesirable plants but also broad-leafed crops, by air-
plane on an adjoining cornfield belonging to a neighbor. 00 In
upholding a verdict for the plaintiffs, the court first described the
standard of care:
Courts generally have held that farmers have the right to
97. Id. at 690-91, 348 N.W.2d at 547 (citing Lundberg v. Bolon, 67 Ariz.
259, 267, 194 P.2d 454, 459 (1948); S. A. Gerrard Co. v. Fricker, 42 Ariz. 503,
507, 27 P.2d 678, 680 (1933); Miles v. A. Arena & Co., 23 Cal. App. 2d 680, 685,
73 P.2d 1260, 1262 (1973); Lenk v. Spezia, 95 Cal. App. 2d 296, 300, 213 P.2d
47, 50 (1949).
98. A more traditional analysis of a negligence action requires that the com-
ponent parts of negligence are duty, violation thereof, and resulting injury. See,
e.g., Crouse v. Wilbur-Ellis Co., 77 Ariz. 359, 272 P.2d 352 (1954). However,
the vast majority of cases involving pesticide exposure break the issues down as
described in the text and often do not delineate whether evidence is used to
support a finding of a duty, violation of a duty or causation.
99. 84 S.D. 493, 173 N.W.2d 272 (1969).
100. Id. Other cases concerning crop loss caused by 2,4-D are discussed
infra notes 107-09, 131-33, 143, 174 & 180 and accompanying text.
1990] 381
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use beneficial dusts and sprays to eliminate weeds which
choke out or stunt growth. However, such use cannot be
made with absolute impunity and due care must be exer-
cised in seeing that weather conditions are right and that
the poisonous spray or dust is not negligently spread.' 0 '
The plaintiff testified that he observed the defendant's plane fly-
ing over his farmstead and directly above him in his farmyard.' 0 2
He also described a "good stiff breeze" that increased in velocity
during the spraying and that blew from the direction of the neigh-
boring farm. Furthermore, he testified that he smelled a very
strong spraying odor and felt the liquid spray against his skin and
face.' 03 The court concluded that the evidence was sufficient for
the jury to find that the defendant's pilot did not exercise due
care under existing weather conditions, and further discharged
the spray too close to plaintiffs' property so that the spray drifted
upon their property or fell upon it as the pilot passed over-
head.10 4 Typically, if the plaintiff presents evidence that an appli-
cator of pesticides sprayed on a windy day and caused spray drift
or that the applicator failed to take precautions to prevent over-
spraying on plaintiff's property, courts will hold the applicator li-
able in negligence for damages caused by the spray.' 0 5
101. Id. at 495, 173 N.W.2d at 273. See also Faire v. Burke, 363 Mo. 562,
252 S.W.2d 289 (1952). A similar standard is articulated in Miles v. A. Arena &
Co., 23 Cal. App. 2d 680, 73 P.2d 1260 (1937):
It must be conceded that, in itself, dusting vegetables to kill pests that
prey upon them is a necessary and lawful operation which the owner of
the vegetables may perform, either himself or through his servants, or
may have performed by an independent contractor. However, he
should not do the dusting, or have it done, under conditions which
would indicate to a reasonably prudent person that damage to his
neighbor would result.
Id. at 683, 73 P.2d at 1262. Later in the discussion, the court seems to term the
invasion of plaintiff's property by a poisonous dust applied by defendants as a
nuisance. Id. Although nuisance actions originally required a showing of inten-
tional interference with a plaintiff's use and enjoyment of land, over time, negli-
gent interferences also became actionable, resulting in much confusion in the
case law. See, e.g., W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER &
KEETON ON TORTS § 91 (5th ed. 1984).
102. Wieting, 84 S.D. at 496, 173 N.W.2d at 273.
103. Id. at 496, 173 N.W.2d at 273-74.
104. Id. at 497-98, 173 N.W.2d at 274. Specifically the jury could find that
the wind velocity was in excess of what was reasonably safe for aerial spraying.
105. See, e.g., McLouth v. General Tel. Co. of the Southwest, 164 F. Supp.
496 (W.D. Ark. 1958) (spray drift and overspraying); Binder v. Perkins, 213 Kan.
365, 516 P.2d 1012 (1973) (overspraying); Sullivan v. Voyles, 249 Ark. 948, 462
S.W.2d 454 (Ark. 1971) (overspraying); Bivins v. Southern Ry. Co., 247 N.C.
711, 102 S.E.2d 128 (1958) (spray drift); Moore v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry.
Co., 301 S.W.2d 395 (Mo. 1957) (spray drift); Kentucky Aerospray v. Mays, 251
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Even when there is considerable evidence that the defendant
took precautions to avoid spray drift or overspraying, courts have
held applicators liable in negligence by application of res ipsa loqui-
tur.106 In Bloxsom v. San Luis Valley Crop Care, Inc.,107 the plaintiff
sued an aerial applicator who sprayed 2,4-D on a nearby barley
field for damage to plaintiff's alfalfa crop - a broad-leafed crop.
Despite the defendant's use of a number of procedures to protect
adjoining properties, 08 the trial court was convinced by testi-
mony that suggested herbicides were present in plaintiff's fields
on the day of the spraying. The absence of any other explanation
for the damage to plaintiff's crop led the court to conclude that
the damage would not have occurred in the absence of negligence
and therefore upheld the trial court's application of res ipsa
loquitur.09
Another basis for finding a negligent act involving pesticide
application is a defendant's deviation from the standard of care
set by a state statute regulating pesticide application. In Bennett v.
Larsen Co., 1 the plaintiff alleged that defendants had violated a
S.W.2d 460 (Ky. 1952) (overspraying); Faire v. Burkes, 363 Mo. 562, 252
S.W.2d 289 (1952) (spray drift); Miles v. A. Arena & Co., 23 Cal. App. 2d 680,
73 P.2d 1260 (1937) (spray drift).
106. In Bloxsom v. San Luis Valley Crop Care, Inc., 198 Colo. 113, 566
P.2d 1189 (1979), the court listed the essential elements of res ipsa loquitur:
1. The event is the kind which ordinarily does not occur in the ab-
sence of negligence[;]
2. Other responsible causes, including the conduct of the plaintiff and
third persons, are sufficiently eliminated by the evidence[;]
3. The indicated negligence is within the scope of the defendant's
duty to the plaintifi;] and
4. The plaintiffs are free from any contributory negligence or other
responsibilities.
Id. at 116, 596 P.2d at 1191 (footnote and citations omitted).
107. Id.
108. Id. These procedures included building fires around the barley field
to create smoke from which the direction and velocity of the wind could be de-
termined and stationing flagmen on the ground to inform the pilot of the air-
plane whether conditions were propitious for spraying. Id. at 115, 596 P.2d at
1190.
109. Id. at 117, 596 P.2d at 1191. The plaintiff testified that he smelled a
chemical odor which he believed was that of an herbicide in his field and later in
the day of the spraying he noticed the tips of his alfalfa plants drooping. More-
over, he presented expert testimony that after the spraying his alfalfa crop
showed damage that probably resulted from the application of some type of her-
bicide and testimony that other area alfalfa crops grew normally during the sea-
son. Id. at 115-16, 596 P.2d at 1190-91. The trial court also noted that neither
the late frost, subsequent grazing nor plaintiff's own application of herbicides
caused the damage. Id. at 116, 596 P.2d at 1191.
110. 118 Wis. 2d 681, 348 N.W.2d 540 (1984), reversing in part and affirming in
part and remanding, 114 Wis. 2d 265, 338 N.W.2d 510 (Wis. Ct. App. 1983).
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provision of the Economic Poisons Act that prohibited the "[u]se
[of] any pesticide in a manner inconsistent with its labeling."" '
After articulating the circumstances under which a negligence per
se rule could be applied,"12 the court recognized that the Eco-
nomic Poisons Act was intended to extend protection from eco-
nomic poisons which were highly toxic to people, plants and
animals and which were a danger to public health and safety be-
yond that provided by the common law."13 Quoting the legisla-
tive history of the statute, which noted the inadequate regulation
of many economic poisons and lack of proper protection of con-
sumers against improperly used pesticides, the court concluded
that the legislature intended to prevent the improper use of pesti-
cides dangerous to people, animals and plant life by requiring
users to apply pesticides in accordance with label directions." 4
The court assumed that the label directions "inform the user of
what life may be affected by the pesticide and of the optimal way
to use and apply the pesticide in a manner which will minimize
the risk of harm to affected life."' '15 Thus, the court held that the
statute established a duty of care for pesticide users to follow la-
bel directions in the use of pesticides and that the failure to fulfill
111. 118 Wis. 2d at 692, 348 N.W.2d at 548 (quoting Wis. STAT. § 94.71
(1975)).
112. The Wisconsin court provided the following standards for applying a
negligence per se rule:
"When a statute provides that under certain circumstances particu-
lar acts shall or shall not be done, it may be interpreted as fixing a
standard ... from which it is negligence to deviate." Prosser on Torts sec.
36 at 190. See also Restatement (Second) of Torts sec. 285 (1965). We
have recognized as safety statutes those legislative enactments which
are designed to protect a class of persons from a particular type of
harm. Walker v. Bignell, 100 Wis.2d 256, 268, 301 N.W.2d 447 (1981).
"[W]here a statute is designed to protect a class of persons from a par-
ticular type of harm, a violation of the statute which results in that type
of harm to someone in the protected class constitutes negligence per se.
Meihost v. Meihost, 29 Wis.2d 537, 540, 139 N.W.2d 116 (1966) (foot-
note omitted); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts secs. 286, 288
(1965). However, we have limited the application of this rule, stat-
ing,".. .statutes are not to be extended so as to impose any duty be-
yond that imposed by the common law unless such statute clearly and
beyond any reasonable doubt expresses such purpose by language that
is clear, unambiguous, and peremptory." Delaney v. Supreme Investment
Co., 251 Wis. 374, 380, 29 N.W.2d 754 (1947) (citations omitted).
Whether we apply a negligence per se rule is also dependent upon the
legislative purpose in enacting the statute. See Burke v. Milwaukee & Sub-
urban Transport Corp., 39 Wis.2d 682, 689-90, 159 N.W.2d 700 (1968).
Bennett, 118 Wis. 2d at 693-94, 348 N.W.2d at 548-49.
113. Id. at 694, 348 N.W.2d at 549.
114. Id. at 695, 348 N.W.2d at 549.
115. Id.
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that duty constitutes negligence per se." 1 6
Bennett is also noteworthy because of the facts of the case. In
Bennett, the plaintiff sought to hold the defendants liable for the
death of honeybees. The death of the bees was not caused by
pesticide spray drift or overspraying, the usual bases for liability,
but was caused by the bees' foraging practices which allowed for
the transfer of contaminated pollen from sprayed neighboring
fields back to the hive. Most courts regard bees and other animals
foraging in sprayed neighboring fields as trespassers and refuse
to impose on landowners a duty to protect these "trespassers"
from the danger of pesticides. 1 7 However, the Wisconsin court
in Bennett interpreted the label directions on the pesticide sprayed
by defendants as imposing on the user an affirmative duty to warn
beekeepers owning hives within bee flight range of an affected
field that spraying will take place." 8 To fulfill this duty, the court
required the user to take reasonable steps to ascertain and warn
those who might be affected by the spraying and to give the warn-
ing far enough in advance of the spraying so as to give the bee-
keepers sufficient time to take precautionary steps. Once
appropriate warnings are given, the pesticide user is not liable for
the death of bees on the field at the time of spraying or for loss
caused by bees bringing contaminated pollen back to the hive." 9
In Iowa, a similar duty has been imposed on pesticide users to
116. Bennett, 118 Wis. 2d at 695-96, 348 N.W.2d at 549. See also Perzinski v.
Chevron Chem. Co., 503 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1974) (applying Wisconsin law,
court held that seller's making of representations different from pesticide's label
violated state statute and constituted negligence per se); J.L. Wilson Farms, Inc.
v. Wallace, 267 Ark. 643, 590 S.W.2d 42 (Ark. Ct. App. 1979) (although court
did not discuss negligence per se, court did uphold admission of evidence that
defendants failed to comply with regulation requiring state authorization of
commercial aerial application, state approval of the aircraft used for the spraying
and notice of the spraying).
117. Bennett, 118 Wis. 2d at 691, 348 N.W.2d at 547 (quoting Lenk v. Spe-
zia, 95 Cal. App. 2d 296, 302-03, 213 P.2d 47, 51 (1949)). See also Aycock v.
Norfolk-Southern Ry. Co., 256 N.C. 604, 124 S.E.2d 566 (1962); McKennon v.
Jones, 219 Ark. 671, 244 S.W.2d 138 (1950); Jeanes v. Holtz, 94 Cal. App. 2d
826, 211 P.2d 925 (1949).
118. Bennett, 118 Wis. 2d at 698, 348 N.W.2d at 550. Defendants had
sprayed Lannate on corn fields. The Lannate label included the following lan-
guage: "This product is toxic to bees and should not be applied when bees are
actively visiting the area. Apply late in evening or early morning where honey
bees visit fields." Id. at 687, 348 N.W.2d at 546. Another case imposing a duty
to warn is Crouse v. Wilbur-Ellis Co., 77 Ariz. 359, 367-68, 272 P.2d 352, 357-
58 (1954).
119. Bennett, 118 Wis. 2d at 699, 348 N.W.2d at 550-51. It is unclear how
this rule operates in the real world, inasmuch as it is unclear how a beekeeper
warned of spraying on neighboring land is to prevent the harm and keep the
bees confined to his property.
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their lessees who raise animals on the leased premises. 120
In summary, courts have recognized that despite a land-
owner's right to use pesticides, harm to a neighbor's property re-
sulting from such use is unreasonable and entitles the neighbor to
compensation. By recognizing property loss from pesticides as
unreasonable harm, courts are making the judgment that freedom
from such harm is an interest worthy of protection and abroga-
tion of that right is compensable, even without a showing that the
defendant engaged in a specific negligent act, so long as the court
is satisfied that the defendant caused the harm.
(2) Causation
Courts which allow plaintiffs to recover for property damage
caused by negligent spraying of neighboring property do not, of
course, allow unlimited recovery; the plaintiff also must present
evidence that plaintiff's damage was caused by exposure to de-
fendant's pesticides. 12 1 This requirement is consistent with the
general belief, evident throughout tort cases, that it is unfair to
require an individual to pay for another's tragedy unless it is
shown that it is more likely than not that he caused it.122
Evidence establishing negligent application of pesticides is
also useful in establishing causation, and generally, when the
plaintiff presents testimony that pesticides applied by the defend-
ant reached the property that was damaged, that the pesticide ap-
plied generally causes the type of damage which occurred, and
that the property suffered the type of damage typically caused by
the pesticide applied, proof of causation is established. For ex-
120. See, e.g., Knapp v. Simmons, 345 N.W.2d 118 (Iowa 1984) (landlord
may be liable to tenant for loss of cattle which were poisoned by eating poison
left by landlord on leased premises); Brown v. Sioux City, 242 Iowa 1196, 49
N.W.2d 853 (Iowa 1951) (city liable to plaintiff beekeeper for loss of bees caused
when it sprayed land adjoining plot leased to plaintiff).
121. One court attempted to articulate precisely the legal standard that
must be met to prove "proximate causation." See Crouse v. Wilbur-Ellis Co., 77
Ariz. 359, 368-69, 272 P.2d 352, 357-58 (1954). However, even Crouse indicates
the difficulty of defining proximate cause with any precision, and like the cases
discussed infra notes 123-28 and accompanying text, simply talks about the type
of evidence that establishes causation.
122. See, e.g., In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litigation, 597 F. Supp. 740
(E.D.N.Y. 1984). This statement refers to the plaintiff's burden of proving
cause-in-fact which is essentially a question of fact. Some courts also must be
satisfied that the defendant is the proximate or legal cause of plaintiff's injury
before imposing liability. In pesticide cases, however, if a plaintiff satisfies the
burden of proving cause-in-fact, courts seem to assume that proximate cause is
satisfied as well.
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ample, in Miles v. A. Arena & Co.,' 23 plaintiff sought to hold the
defendants liable for destruction of their bees allegedly caused by
defendants' spraying of their honeydew fields with calcium arse-
nate. The appellate court upheld defendants' liability, citing evi-
dence that the defendants sprayed their honeydew fields with
calcium arsenate, a poisonous dust, that a light wind was blowing
on the day of the dusting, and that the dust floated from the de-
fendants' fields to plaintiff's apiary on neighboring land. 24 The
trial court's finding that the dust killed plaintiff's bees was sup-
ported further by evidence that calcium arsenate contains suffi-
cient arsenic to kill bees and that dead bees were found about two
weeks after the dusting. 2 5
Some courts seem willing to infer causation simply from the
fact that the substance sprayed is poisonous. 26 Others seem to
look to expert testimony establishing that the pesticide is danger-
ous to the type of property raised by the plaintiff or establishing
the link between the substance sprayed and the damage to the
plaintiff.' 27 Some courts also require that the plaintiff show that
the damage did not result from other causes, such as poor cultiva-
tion. 12 8 In every case, however, it is essential that plaintiff suffer
some property loss before a court will allow recovery.
(3) Damages
With respect to proof of damages, a number of jurisdictions
have recognized a plaintiff's right to recover when negligent ap-
123. 23 Cal. App. 2d 680, 73 P.2d 1260 (1937).
124. Id. at 682, 73 P.2d at 1261.
125. Id. at 682, 73 P.2d at 1261-62. See also Kentucky Aerospray v. Mays,
251 S.W.2d 460 (Ky. 1952) (judgment for plaintiff supported by evidence that
mist from aircraft spraying chemical compound containing toxaphene flew from
defendant's aircraft as it circled plaintiff's pond, that toxaphene will kill fish, that
sampling in pond showed toxaphene concentrations three times amount needed
to be deadly to all fish life in pond, and that all of plaintiff's minnows in pond
died within seven or eight days after spraying). Cf Swickard v. Crecelius
Ranches, Inc., 211 Cal. Rptr. 187 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (no recovery because
plaintiff failed to prove that defendant's spraying of orchard caused loss of plain-
tiff's bees).
126. See, e.g., Alexander v. Seaboard Air Line R.R. Co., 221 S.C. 477, 71
S.E.2d 299 (1952); McKennon v.Jones, 219 Ark. 671, 244 S.W.2d 138 (1951); S.
A. Gerrard Co. v. Fricker, 42 Ariz. 503, 27 P.2d 678 (1933).
127. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Smith, 220 Ark. 223, 247 S.W.2d 16
(1952); Lundberg v. Bolon, 67 Ariz. 259, 194 P.2d 454 (1948).
128. See, e.g., Faire v. Burke, 363 Mo. 562, 252 S.W.2d 289 (1952). See also
Bloxsom v. San Luis Valley Crop Care, Inc., 198 Colo. 113, 596 P.2d 1189
(1979) (upheld trial court's finding that other causes, such as late frost, subse-
quent grazing or plaintiff's own spraying, caused plaintiffs' crop damage).
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plication of pesticides on a neighboring property results in the
destruction of animals on plaintiff's property. 129 Similarly, courts
have upheld a plaintiff's right to recover where such negligent
application of herbicides has resulted in the destruction of crops
or other vegetation on plaintiff's property. 130 A recurring fact
pattern involves spray drift from or overspraying of defendant's
fields with 2,4-D resulting in the destruction of broad-leaf crops
on plaintiff's lands.' 3 ' In evaluating the measure of damages, at
129. See, e.g., Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Smith, 220 Ark. 223, 247
S.W.2d 16 (1952) (affirmed judgment for plaintiff for loss of plaintiff's cows from
defendant's spraying vegetation under its lines on plaintiff's land); McKennon v.
Jones, 219 Ark. 671, 244 S.W.2d 138 (1951) (affirmed judgment for plaintiff for
damages to plaintiff's honey bees caused by negligent spraying of cotton on de-
fendant's land); Lundberg v. Bolon, 67 Ariz. 259, 194 P.2d 454 (1948) (upheld
jury's verdict that defendant's negligent spraying of cotton crop caused destruc-
tion of plaintiff's bees); Miles v. A. Arena & Co., 23 Cal. App. 2d 680, 73 P.2d
1260 (1937) (upheld award of damages for destruction of bees as a result of
spraying of melons one half mile away); S. A. Gerrard v. Fricker, 42 Ariz. 503, 27
P.2d 678 (1933) (upheld judgment for plaintiff for damages to plaintiff's apiary
caused by negligent spraying of defendant's lettuce fields); Kentucky Aerospray,
Inc. v. Mays, 251 S.W.2d 460 (Ky. Ct. App. 1952) (upheld plaintiff's verdict for
destruction of minnows in pond on plaintiff's land from toxaphene compound
sprayed on defendant's tobacco fields).
130. See, e.g., Bivins v. Southern Ry Co., 247 N.C. 711, 102 S.E.2d 128
(1958) (upheld judgment for plaintiffs for damage to garden, fruit, trees, and
pasture resulting from chemicals that drifted when defendant sprayed right of
way); Crouse v. Wilbur-Ellis Co., 77 Ariz. 359, 272 P.2d 352 (1954) (court re-
versed judgment n.o.v. for defendant and held that evidence that insecticide
sprayed on cotton crop drifted onto and severely damaged plaintiff's cantaloupe
crop was sufficient to support verdict for plaintiffs on theory of negligence). Cf.
Sun Pipe Line Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 514 S.W.2d 789 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974) (no
liability where jury did not find that defendant was negligent in spraying its ease-
ment across plaintiff's land, despite finding that chemical spray drifted onto
plaintiff's land).
131. See, e.g., Bloxsom v. San Luis Valley Crop Care, Inc., 198 Colo. 113,
596 P.2d 1189 (1979) (affirmed trial court judgment against defendant for dam-
age to plaintiff's alfalfa crop resulting from negligent spraying of 2,4-D on de-
fendant's barley fields); Binder v. Perkins, 213 Kan. 365, 516 P.2d 1012 (1973)
(upheld judgment for plaintiff for damages to plaintiff's alfalfa crop caused by
defendant's negligent spraying of 2,4-D on neighboring wheat field); Wieting v.
Ball Air Spray, Inc., 84 S.E. 493, 173 N.W.2d 272 (1969) (upheld jury's verdict
for plaintiffs where evidence showed that 2,4-D sprayed on defendant's corn
field blew onto and damaged plaintiffs' trees and gardens); Pendergrass v. Love-
lace, 57 N.M. 661, 262 P.2d 231 (1953) (upheld trial court judgment for plaintiff
for damage to plaintiff's cotton crop resulting from negligent spraying of 2,4-D
on defendant's adjacent field); Heeb v. Prysock, 219 Ark. 899, 245 S.W.2d 577
(1952) (upheld plaintiffs' verdict allowing recovery for damage to cotton crops
caused by negligent spraying of defendant's rice crop with 2,4-D); Alexander v.
Seaboard Air Line R.R. Co., 221 S.C. 477, 71 S.E.2d 299 (1952) (affirmedjudg-
ment against defendants for damage to plaintiff's cotton crop caused by drift of
2,4-D sprayed on defendant's right of way); Gragg v. Allen, 481 S.W.2d 452
(Tex. Civ. App. 1972) (upheld implied finding that defendant's negligent spray-
ing of 2,4-D damaged plaintiffs' cotton crops).
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least one jurisdiction requires that the plaintiff must minimize
damages after the spraying.13 2
The foregoing survey of appellate cases suggests that when
plaintiffs present evidence that defendants applied pesticides on a
windy day or oversprayed pesticides, and that damage of the type
associated with the pesticide occurs to plaintiff's crops or animals,
defendants are found to be negligent and liable for the ensuing
damage. Indeed, a number of special legal rules, such as the use
of res ipsa loquitur and negligence per se have been applied in the
area of negligent application of pesticides to ease plaintiffs' recov-
ery. Courts seem concerned that given the dangerous nature of
pesticides, landowners who use them must exercise the utmost
caution and even then, liability for ensuing harm may attach.
Moreover, some courts, recognizing the hazardous nature of
pesticide application, have applied the nondelegation rule and
strict liability in pesticide damage cases to hold a landowner liable
for the negligence of an applicator and to ease plaintiff's burden
of proving negligence in these cases.
b. Nondelegation Rule
In most pesticide damage cases, plaintiffs sue and recover
against the negligent applicator.' 33 In addition, many jurisdic-
tions allow recovery against the landowner even when the pesti-
cides were negligently applied by an independent contractor. In
general, of course, a party is not liable for the negligent act of an
independent contractor. 3 4 However, an important exception to
this rule has evolved and is also generally recognized: when a
party employs a contractor to carry on an inherently or intrinsi-
cally dangerous activity, that party cannot thereby insulate him-
132. See Faire v. Burke, 363 Mo. 562, 252 S.W.2d 289 (1952). In a subse-
quent case, a Missouri court discussed the valuation of crop damage. See Moore
v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co., 301 S.W.2d 395 (Mo. Ct. App. 1957). See also
Binder v. Perkins, 213 Kan. 365, 516 P.2d 1012 (1973); J.L. Wilson Farms, Inc.
v. Wallace, 267 Ark. 643, 590 S.W.2d 42 (Ark. Ct. App. 1979).
133. See, e.g., Bloxsom v. San Luis Valley Crop Care, Inc., 198 Colo. 113,
596 P.2d 1189 (1979); Binder v. Perkins, 213 Kan. 365, 516 P.2d 1012 (1973);
Kentucky Aerospray v. Mays, 251 S.W.2d 460 (Ky. Ct. App. 1952); Wieting v.
Ball Air Spray, Inc., 84 S.D. 493, 173 N.W.2d 272 (1969); Miles v. A. Arena &
Co., 23 Cal. App. 2d 680, 73 P.2d 1260 (1937).
134. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 409 (1966). See also Boroughs
v. Joiner, 337 So. 2d 340, 342 (Ala. 1976); Pendergrass v. Lovelace, 57 N.M.
661, -, 262 P.2d 231, 232 (1953); McKennon v. Jones, 219 Ark. 671, 673, 244
S.W.2d 138, 140 (1951); S. A. Gerrard Co. v. Fricker, 42 Ariz. 503, 506, 27 P.2d
678, 680 (1933).
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self from liability.1 3 5
In Emelwon, Inc. v. United States,136 the court explained the
purpose of imposing a nondelegable duty in the context of a dan-
gerous activity:
[L]iability is imposed on the employer for his own failure
to exercise reasonable care in a situation in which the
work is sufficiently dangerous that the employer himself
has a duty to third persons who may sustain injuries
from the work unless proper precautions are taken in the
performance thereof. The taking of such precautions is
a duty which the employer may not delegate to his in-
dependent contractor so as to evade liability. Should in-
jury occur under such circumstances of sufficiently great
danger the employer is liable for the breach of his own
"nondelegable duty" to take precautions against harm to
third parties.13 7
A number of jurisdictions have categorized cropdusting and
spraying as an inherently or intrinsically dangerous activity mak-
ing inapplicable the rule that a principal is not liable for the torts
of his independent contractor.13 8 As one court summarized the
status of crop dusting in the law: "[T]he authorities are practi-
cally uniform in holding that crop dusting is an activity sufficiently
freighted with danger to impose liability upon the landowner hav-
ing the work done if negligence is proven, even though the fault,
if any, is that of an independent contractor." 13 9
135. See. e.g., Emelwon v. United States, 391 F.2d 9 (5th Cir. 1968) cert.
denied Florida v. Emelwon, Inc., 393 U.S. 841 (1968) (Florida law); Boroughs, 337
So. 2d at 342; S. A. Gerrard, 27 P.2d at 680; McKennon, 244 S.W.2d at 140; Pender-
grass, 262 P.2d at 232; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 427A (1966).
136. Emelwon, 391 F.2d at 9.
137. Id. at 11.
138. Alabama-Boroughs, 337 So.2d. 340. Arkansas--Copeland v. Hollings-
worth, 259 Ark. 603, 535 S.W.2d 815 340 (1976); Southwestern Bell Tele. Co. v.
Smith, 220 Ark. 233, 247 S.W.2d 16 (Ark. 1952); McKennon, 219 Ark. 671, 244
S.W.2d 138. Arizona-Crouse v. Wilbur-Ellis Co., 77 Ariz. 359, 272 P.2d 352,
(1954); S. A. Gerrard, 42 Ariz. 503, 27 P.2d 678. New Mexico-Pendergrass, 57 N.M.
661, 262 P.2d 231. South Carolina-Alexander v. Seaboard Air Line R. Co., 221
S.C. 477, 71 S.E.2d 299 (S.C. 1952). Teacs--Gragg v. Allen, 481 S.W.2d 452
(Tex. Civ. App. 1972). This case ignores Pitchfork Land and Cattle Co. v. King,
162 Tex. 331, 346 S.W.2d 598 (1961), which holds an applicator, who acted as
an independent contractor, negligent for spray drift, but did not consider
whether the landowner could be held responsible under the nondelegation doc-
trine. See Sun Pipe Line Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 514 S.W.2d 789, 793 (Tex. Civ. App.
1979).
139. Loe v. Lenhardt, 277 Or. 242, 247, 362 P.2d 312, 315 (1961).
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Courts have brought pesticide spraying into the nondelega-
tion rule because of the great likelihood of the drifting of a poi-
sonous substance onto neighboring property, 140 because of the
recognition of the dangers of spray drift in statutes regulating
pesticide use,' 4 ' or simply because of the potentially dangerous
characteristics of pesticides.142
c. Strict Liability
A number ofjurisdictions have taken the consequences of ap-
plying inherently dangerous pesticides one step further and have
imposed strict liability on a landowner for property damage to
neighboring property caused by pesticide spray drift. In these ju-
risdictions, negligence or fault is not a requisite to liability.
Probably the first jurisdiction to impose strict liability was
Louisiana. In Gotreaux v. Gary,'43 the court found from the evi-
dence that an applicator sprayed.2,4-D on defendant's rice crop
and that the wind carried the herbicide to plaintiff's cotton and
pea crop thereby causing destruction of plaintiff's crop. In decid-
ing the appropriate legal standards to apply, the court balanced
two considerations:
First, to give the owner of property the largest liberty
possible in the use, occupation and improvement of his
own property, consistent with the right to employ mod-
em methods and machinery in accomplishing the im-
provements desired; and second, that one may not use
his own property to the injury of any legal right of
another. 144
The court recognized both the importance of the rice crop in
Louisiana and that herbicides are necessary to its cultivation.
However, the plaintiff could not be deprived of his privilege of
raising his cotton and pea crops because of defendant's use of
spraying operations. Hence, because the plaintiff was deprived of
the liberty of enjoying his farm, the court imposed strict liability
on the defendant. 45
140. See, e.g., S. A. Gerrard, 42 Ariz. at 507, 27 P.2d at 680; Copeland, 259 Ark.
at 603, 535 S.W.2d at 816; Gragg, 481 S.W.2d at 454.
141. See, e.g., Boroughs v. Joiner, 337 So. 2d 340, 343 (Ala. 1976).
142. See, e.g., Pendergrass, 57 N.M. 661, 262 P.2d 231.
143. 232 La. 373, 94 So. 2d 293 (1957) (quoting Fotenot v. Magnolia Petro-
leum Co., 227 La. 866, 80 So. 2d 845 (1955)).
144. Gotreaux, 232 La. at 378, 94 So. 2d at 294.
145. Id. at 378-79, 94 So. 2d at 294-95. See also Russel v. Windsor Proper-
1990]
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In jurisdictions imposing strict liability for property damage
from the drifting of pesticides, "[t]he question in general is not
whether defendant acted with due care and caution, but whether
his acts occasioned the damage." 46 Thus, while the plaintiff need
not prove fault, causation must still be shown. Proof of causation,
however, seems to justify the imposition of liability, a judgment
that implies that the defendant has invaded an interest of the
plaintiff's worthy of protection.
It is interesting to examine how courts determine whether
pesticide spraying activity is sufficiently hazardous to subject the
actor to strict liability for any harm caused. It must be first noted
that "it is the duty of the court [and not the jury] to decide as a
matter of law whether a given activity, in a given factual setting, is
or is not extra hazardous."' 4 7 In deciding whether an activity
should be characterized as extra hazardous, an Oregon appellate
court balanced the utility of the defendant's conduct against the
risk of harm if it is miscarried. That court concluded that despite
common usage of aerial spraying, its dangerous character, as evi-
denced by the substantial regulation of that activity in many juris-
dictions, including Oregon, poses a risk that justifies application
of strict liability when actual damage results. 148 It is the voluntary
ties, Inc. 366 So. 2d 219 (La. Ct. App. 1978) (court imposed strict liability on
defendant for damage to plaintiff's cotton crop caused by defendant's spraying
of 2,4-D on his property); Himel v. American Employers Ins. Co., 354 So. 2d
606 (La. Ct. App. 1977) (strict liability imposed for damage caused by spray
drift, despite testimony that latest methods were used and no drift occurred);
Winston v. State Dept. of Hwys., 352 So. 2d 752 (La. Ct. App. 1977) (state held
strictly liable for damage to plaintiff's livestock resulting from spraying of un-
derpass with arsenic); Romero v. Chris Crusta Flying Serv., Inc., 140 So. 2d 734
(La. Ct. App. 1962) (defendants held "solidarily liable" for damages to plain-
tiff's crops caused by drift from defendant's spraying 2,4-D on rice field); Tra-
ban v. Bearb, 138 So. 2d 420 (La. Ct. App. 1962); Jones v. Morgan, 96 So. 2d
109 (La. Ct. App. 1957). But cf. Watson v. Mid-Continent Aerial Sprays, Inc.,
170 So.2d 149 (La. Ct. App. 1965) (court affirmed judgment for defendants be-
cause there was insufficient evidence to establish that death and depreciation in
value of plaintiff's cattle caused by aerial spraying of heptachlor for fire ants).
146. Young v. Darter, 363 P.2d 829, 833 (Okla. 1961) (citing Rylands v.
Fletcher (1868) L.R., 3 H.L. 330). The court seems to also term the invasion of
plaintiff's land by defendant's pesticides a trespass and indicates that the only
defenses available might be where the escape of the poison is owing to plaintiff's
default, or that the escape was the consequence of vis major or the Act of God.
Id.
147. Loe v. Lenhardt, 227 Or. 242, 249, 362 P.2d 312, 316 (1961). See also
Langan v. Valicopters, Inc., 88 Wash. 2d 855, 861, 567 P.2d 218, 221 (1977).
148. Loe v. Lenhardt, 227 Or. 242, 253, 362 P.2d 312, 318 (1961). The
court actually terms the invasion of plaintiff's land by spray drift a trespass
under Martin v. Reynolds Metal Co., 221 Or. 86, 342 P.2d 790 (1959), cert. de-
nied, 362 U.S. 918 (1960) and the Restatement of Torts section 165. Inasmuch
as the Oregon court is imposing liability without fault for harm caused by the
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taking of that risk by the defendant that justifies imposition of
liability. 149
A later Oregon case indicates that liability without fault may
be imposed either when the harm threatened is very serious or
when the risk only moderately threatens economic activities,
rather than harm to life, health or property or environment, but
the activity can be carried on only with a substantial uncontrolla-
ble likelihood that the damage will sometimes occur.150 Thus the
type of harm likely to occur, as well as the probability that it will
occur, is important to a court's decision to impose liability with-
out fault.' 5 '
This statement of the law of strict liability is interesting be-
cause in general, courts only impose strict liability when the risk
of harm is to a plaintiff's property and therefore are reluctant to
apply strict liability principles where the harm is economic or
more generally environmental. 52 However, the Oregon court
defendant's conduct, it is appropriate to categorize Oregon with the strict liabil-
ity jurisdictions.
149. Loe, 277 Or. at 254, 362 P.2d at 318 (citing RESTATEMENT TORTS § 165
(1934)).
150. Bella v. Aurora Air, Inc., 279 Or. 13, 23, 566 P.2d 489, 494 (1977). See
also Langan, 88 Wash. 2d at 862, 567 P.2d at 222 (discussing uncontrollability of
drift and impossibility of eliminating risk of drift).
151. Bella v. Aurora Air, Inc., 279 Or. 13, 566 P.2d 489 (1977). A land-
owner who applies a pesticide heavily regulated by statute is almost certainly
subject to strict liability under Oregon law. Id.
152. See, e.g., In re TMI Litigation Governmental Entities Claims, 544 F.
Supp. 853, 858 (M.D. Pa. 1982), vacated and remanded sub norn Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania v. General Pub. Utils. Corp., 710 F.2d 117 (3d Cir. 1983) (govern-
mental entities cannot recover in strict liability for costs incurred in responding
to nuclear incident in absence of allegations that government's property was ac-
tually injured); City of Bridgeton v. B.P. Oil, Inc., 146 N.J. Super. 169, 177, 369
A.2d 49, 54 (Law Div. 1976) (city, which had expended money and used its em-
ployees to prevent spread of oil spill caused by leaks in defendant's gasoline or
fuel oil tanks, was not "proper plaintiff" at common law to seek recovery in
strict liability). One explanation for this rule is that strict liability is closely re-
lated to trespass. See, e.g., Loe v. Lenhardt, 227 Or. 242, 362 P.2d 312 (1961)
(discussed supra notes 139, 147-49; Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868)
(leading case from which cause of action for strict liability was developed ap-
pears to have been brought as trespass or nuisance action). A cause of action in
trespass traditionally protects interests in real property, rather than general eco-
nomic interests or the public's interest in the environment. See W. KEETON, D.
DOBBS, R. KEETON, D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 13, at 67, 70-71
(5th ed. 1984). Also, most jurisdictions limit application of strict products liabil-
ity to cases involving personal injury or property damage, but not economic
harm. See, e.g., East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica DeLaval, Inc., 476 U.S.
858, 874-76 (1986). As explained in East River, imposing strict liability, rather
than requiring the plaintiff to prove negligence, satisfies "public policy demands
that responsibility be fixed wherever it will most effectively reduce the hazards to
life and health inherent in defective products that reach the market." Id. at 866
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has expressed a willingness to apply strict liability when economic
harm results, and in one case seems to have done so. In Langan v.
Valicopters, Inc., 153 the Washington court held a spray applicator of
Thiodan and Guthion for a landowner's Colorado beetle infesta-
tion strictly liable to neighboring organic farmers who were
forced to pull their crops when the spray settled on their crops.
The loss to the organic farmers was not that the crops died as a
result of the spraying, as in most cases where strict liability is im-
posed. Rather, the crops exceeded the pesticide residue toler-
ances allowed for the crops to be certified as organically grown
and the plaintiffs' land was decertified. The plaintiffs pulled the
contaminated crops to prevent further contamination.
In applying the factors used to determine whether an activity
is abnormally dangerous thereby subjecting the actor to strict lia-
bility,' 54 the Washington court not only considers the character-
istics of pesticide spraying, i.e., that drift is impossible to
eliminate, 55 but also seems to advance a number of policy prefer-
ences. For example, in determining whether an activity is inap-
propriate for the place where it is carried on, the court concludes
that "[g]iven the nature of organic farming, the use of pesticides
adjacent to such an area must be considered an activity conducted
in an inappropriate place."'' 56 Since courts applying strict liability
principles generally balance the rights of plaintiffs and defendants
(quoting Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436,
441 (1944)). For similar reasons of safety, this duty includes protection against
property damage, but not against economic interests; when the risk of harm is
to persons or property, responsibility is imposed not on the person who suffers
the injury and is unable to protect himself from that injury, but rather on the
manufacturer, who is better able to reduce the risk or, when loss occurs, to ab-
sorb that loss. Id. at 866-67; Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Trac-
tor Co., 652 F.2d 1165, 1172 (3d Cir. 1981).
153. 88 Wash. 2d 855, 567 P.2d 218 (1977).
154. These factors are as follows:
(a) Whether the activity involves a high degree of risk of some harm
to the person, land or chattels of others;
(b) Whether the gravity of the harm which may result from it is likely
to be great;
(c) Whether the risk cannot be eliminated by the exercise of reason-
able care;
(d) Whether the activity is not a matter of common usage;
(e) Whether the activity is inappropriate to the place where it is car-
ried on; and
(f) The value of the activity to the community.
Id. at 861, 567 P.2d at 222 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520
(1981)).
155. Id. at 862, 567 P.2d at 222.
156. Id. at 864, 567 P.2d at 223.
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to use their land as they see fit, 15 7 the court could just as easily
have concluded that organic farming is inappropriate to an area
where pesticides are used.' 58 By not doing so, the court elevates
the value of plaintiff's choice to engage in organic farming above
that of the defendant's choice to use pesticides. This value pref-
erence is more apparent in the court's application of the sixth fac-
tor - the value of the activity to the community. The court
acknowledges the value of pesticide use to control pests and in-
crease production but concludes that, despite farmers' statutory
duty to prevent the spread of pests, 5 9 it is the user of the pesti-
cide, and not the adjacent landowner, who should bear the loss
caused by pesticides because the user benefits from their contin-
ued application while the neighbors have been eliminated from
the organic food market through no fault of their own. 160
Thus, cases holding users of pesticides strictly liable for dam-
age caused to neighboring property owners by the pesticides are
the culmination of a trend that can be seen in negligence cases. 16'
Courts rely on statutes regulating pesticides, as well as evidence
157. See supra notes 143-45 and accompanying text.
158. The court could have applied a sort of "coming to the nuisance" anal-
ysis, see W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON
TORTS, § 88b, at 634-36 (5th ed. 1984), and determined that the organic farmers
came to an area where chemical pesticides were used and voluntarily subjected
themselves to the risk that pesticides applied on a neighboring property would
drift onto their property. Alternatively, if the court had decided that the plain-
tiffs must prove negligence to recover against the defendant, their recovery
might have been barred by an argument that they assumed the risk of the type of
injury they suffered. Obviously, the court chose not to view the situation in
these ways.
159. Indeed, the court reads the statute as creating almost a legislative
mandate to use pesticides. 88 Wash. 2d at 865, 567 P.2d at 223 (citing WASH.
REV. CODE §§ 15.08.030, 17.10.140, .150 (1971)).
160. Id
161. The rationales behind many negligence cases are indistinguishable
from those employing strict liability. For example, although Miles v. Arena, dis-
cussed supra notes 123-25 and accompanying text, imposes liability on the basis
of negligence, a later California appellate decision, without acknowledging that
it may be breaking new ground, remanded a case dismissed on the pleadings by
the trial court for a determination by the trial court of whether the jury should
be instructed on a theory of strict liability. See SKF Farms v. Super. Court, 153
Cal. App. 3d 902, 200 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1984).
It is unclear, however, why jurisdictions employing far reaching negligence
theories have refused to adopt strict liability to pesticide property damage cases,
particularly since the rationales behind both types of rules are so similar. For
example, in Bennett, discussed supra notes 110-19 and accompanying text, Wis-
consin rejected strict liability, but allowed the case to proceed on a negligence
per se theory for reasons similar to those employed by the Oregon court in Bella
and Loe. Similarly, although New Mexico recognizes the nondelegation rule in
crop dusting cases, see supra note 142, a recent case suggests that strict liability
may not be imposed. Ligocky v. Wilcox, 95 N.M. 275, 620 P.2d 1300 (1980).
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of their dangerous characteristics, to conclude that pesticide use
is a hazardous activity and that the user is liable for property loss
linked to that activity, even where caution is used. In short,
courts apply legal rules to compensate for any unconsented expo-
sure to pesticide that interferes with the manner in which the
plaintiff chooses to use his or her property, whether it be to grow
crops incompatible with the defendant's pesticide use, to engage
in organic farming, or to raise animals that may be harmed by
defendant's pesticide use.
2. Rights Against Manufacturers and Sellers
a. Negligence
Those who suffer property damage caused by pesticide use
may also have rights of recovery against the manufacturer or
seller of the pesticide. The most prevalent theory of recovery is
negligence. As in cases against neighboring landowners and ap-
plicators, in a negligence action against a manufacturer or seller,
the plaintiff must prove some negligent act that caused plaintiff's
property loss. When there is evidence that a pesticide caused
plaintiff's loss, proof of the manufacturer or seller's negligence is
easily accomplished.
For example, in LaPlant v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 16 2 the
court found sufficient evidence for ajury to find that a weed killer
manufactured by the defendant and sprayed along a drainage
ditch caused nitrates to accumulate in the sprayed foliage.1 63
When this foliage was consumed by plaintiff's cows, nitrate
poisoning and death resulted. 64
Although the pesticide, as sacked and sold, was not poison-
ous, the court upheld the lower court's conclusion that the de-
fendant was negligent for failure to warn of the risk of harm
suffered by the plaintiff.165 The jury found that the application of
defendant's product to the willows left a salty residue on the foli-
age which made it particularly attractive to cattle and resulted in a
lethal accumulation of nitrates. 66 In addition, the jury found that
in the exercise of ordinary care this should have been known to
162. 346 S.W.2d 231 (Mo. Ct. App. 1961) (plaintiff sought recovery for loss
of cattle that ate willows along drainage ditches that third party had sprayed with
weed killer manufactured by defendant).
163. Id. at 234.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. LaPlant, 346 S.W.2d 231.
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the manufacturer. 67 Since there was evidence from which the
jury could find that the danger of nitrate poisoning was foresee-
able by the manufacturer, the manufacturer was negligent in fail-
ing to exercise ordinary care to avoid the danger. 68 However,
the court suggested that a higher standard of care might be appli-
cable; in manufacturing and distributing chemical weed killers,
the manufacturer "in that field is held to the skill of an expert, is
charged with superior knowledge of the nature and qualities of its
products and is obligated reasonably to keep abreast of scientific
information, discoveries and advances."' 169 A finding of negli-
gence was appropriate where the evidence showed that the manu-
facturer's labeling of the pesticide as "not hazardous to livestock"
was misleading. 170 Moreover, this assurance of safety may be neg-
ligent toward people to whom the assurance was not made and
who did not in fact rely on it, such as the plaintiff in the case
before the court.' 7 1
Most cases involving the liability of the manufacturer or
seller of a pesticide are, as in LaPlant, predicated on the defend-
ant's failure to warn of the danger of harm suffered by the plain-
tiff. In a number of cases, courts have found that federal and state
statutes forbidding the sale of economic poisons, such as pesti-
cides which are misbranded, which have a label bearing false and
misleading representations, which lack directions necessary for
the protection of the public, and which lack warnings necessary to
prevent injury to person, vegetation and animals, create a stan-
dard of care. When a label fails to warn of the danger resulting in
harm to a plaintiff, these courts have concluded that the manufac-
turer violated the statutory prohibition against misbranding and
that "violation of the statute constitutes negligence [negligence
per se, that is] as a matter of law precluding the need for establish-
ing the common-law elements of negligence. The statute itself
creates the standard of conduct required."' 72 In adopting negli-
gence per se in actions against manufacturers, these courts, like
those adopting the principle against neighboring landowners,
167. Id. at 241-42.
168. Id. at 240-41.
169. Id. at 240.
170. LaPlant, 346 S.W.2d at 241.
171. Id. at 241-42.
172. McClanahan v. California Spray Chem. Corp., 194 Va. 842, 852, 75
S.E.2d 712, 718 (1953). See also Perzinski v. Chevron Chem. Co., 503 F.2d 654,
658-59 (7th Cir. 1974); Perry Creek Cranberry Corp. v. Hopkins Agr. Chem.
Co., 29 Wis. 2d 429, 438, 139 N.W.2d 96, 101 (1966).
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seek to implement the intent of the statutes to afford protection
from the dangers of economic poisons. 73
b. Strict Liability
A few jurisdictions have focused on the inherently dangerous
character of pesticide spraying and have expanded the liability
rules in actions against sellers and manufacturers of pesticides.
In Chapman Chemical Co. v. Taylor,174 the Arkansas court consid-
ered the liability of a manufacturer and seller of 2,4-D to the
owner of a cotton crop on land three-fourths of a mile from the
land on which the manufacturer/seller's product was used. The
court held that the pesticide was an inherently dangerous product
and that strict liability should be applied. 175 In view of the dan-
gerous nature of the product that it was selling (capability of dam-
aging broad-leafed plants with which it has contact), the court
charged the manufacturer/seller with knowledge of tests which
would have revealed the peculiar carrying quality of the dust it
was selling and imposed liability on the defendant despite an ab-
sence of evidence that the defendant actually knew of that qual-
ity.' 76 Thus, in deciding to apply a rule of strict liability for
property damage, the court is impressed not simply with the in-
herently dangerous characteristic of the pesticide, but rather with
the manufacturer's failure to warn of its propensity to drift and
cause damage. 177
Case law finding sellers and manufacturers liable for prop-
erty damage caused by use of a pesticide is less extensive than
173. McClanahan, 194 Va. at 851, 75 S.E.2d at 717-18. See also Perry Creek,
29 Wis. 2d at 435, 139 N.W.2d at 100.
174. 215 Ark. 630, 222 S.W.2d 820 (1949).
175. Id. at 632, 222 S.W.2d at 821.
176. Id. See also Reasor-Hill Corp. v. Kennedy, 272 S.W.2d 685 (Ark. 1954).
177. Cf. Walton v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 191 F.2d 277 (8th Cir. 1951). In
Walton, a federal case in which the court applied Arkansas law, the court refused
to find error in the trial court's imposition of strict liability against the manufac-
turer of 2,4-D, marked to be mixed in an oil solution. Id. at 282. The court
distinguished Chapman, and refused to reverse the trial court's ruling that 2,4-D
in an oil solution is not an inherently dangerous product. Id. at 281-82. Unlike
the dust considered in Chapman, which was shown to drift great distances and
cause damage regardless of the degree of care employed in its use, in Walton it
was shown that the pesticide could be safely used in an area of mixed crops. Id.
at 282. See also Ligocky v. Wilcox, 95 N.M. 275, 276, 620 P.2d 1300, 1301 (N.M.
Ct. App. 1980) ("[a] conclusion of strict [products] liability does not follow from
the finding that [a pesticide] was intrinsically and inherently dangerous"); Boyd
v. Thompson-Hayward Chem. Co., 450 S.W.2d 937 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970) (in
indemnity action by applicator against manufacturer, court upheld verdict of no
negligence by manufacturer that did warn of damage that could result when 2,4-
D drifts).
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that against landowners and applicators 78 but expresses similar
themes. Courts have recognized that manufacturers of pesticides
have a heightened responsibility to inform users and others ex-
posed to their products about the dangers associated with use of
the product and have imposed liability where this responsibility
has not been met. Courts regard statutes regulating labeling an
expression of intent to afford protection from the dangers of pes-
ticides and have recognized that pesticides are dangerous because
of both their inherent characteristics and propensity to drift off
target. In addition, these cases are significant in that they allow
the user of the pesticide to bring an action against a remote seller
regardless of privity of contract. 179
3. Equitable Relief
There is another theory that one court has used to grant re-
lief to plaintiffs for property damage caused by pesticide applica-
tion. In Kell v. Appalachian Power Co., 18 0 a power company owned a
right-of-way easement over the plaintiffs' property. On at least
two occasions, the power company had applied 2,4,5-T and 2,4-D
(which when applied in equal portions comprise what is popularly
known as Agent Orange) to clear vegetation away from a power
transmission line constructed by the company across the prop-
erty. 18 When the company planned to again spray toxic herbi-
cides, the plaintiffs brought an action to enjoin permanently the
178. One reason the case law in this area may be less extensive is that when
a pesticide causes damage contrary to its label, the user has a fairly straightfor-
ward breach of warranty claim. See, e.g., Corprew v. Geigy Chem. Corp., 271
N.C. 485, 157 S.E.2d 98 (1967); Venie v. South Cent. Enters., Inc., 401 S.W.2d
495 (Mo. App. 1966) (plaintiff recovered for damages to strawberry plant caused
by herbicide sold by defendant and expressly warranted by seller to be "per-
fectly safe for strawberries"); and cases cited supra notes 162-73 and accompany-
ing text. Cf. Wilson v. E-Z Flo Chem. Co., 281 N.C. 506, 189 S.E.2d 221 (1972)
(manufacturer not liable where warning on use of pesticide communicated to
retailer, who failed to communicate warning to user of specific requirements for
use of product). These cases require no showing of negligence or the inherently
dangerous nature of the product and may not result in appellate review.
179. See, e.g., McClanahan, 194 Va. at 859, 75 S.E.2d at 722 (duty to warn
required to prevent injury to objects being treated as well as to people applying
it); Corprew, 271 N.C. at 499, 157 S.E.2d at 108 (court found error in lower
court's dismissal of complaint by user of herbicide, purchased for use on plain-
tiff's corn crop, that allegedly damaged peanut and soybean crops planted on
same land in succeeding years despite warning by manufacturer that herbicide
could have ill effects on succeeding crops of corn and other small grain. Court
allowed case to proceed on theories of negligence and breach of warranty for
failure to warn of potential effects on other crops, such as those planted by
plaintiff).
180. 289 S.E.2d 450 (W. Va. 1982).
181. Id. at 452.
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power company from using any form of toxic herbicide to clear
trees, branches, and other obstructions from the right of way.
The case presented a novel issue inasmuch as the plaintiffs sought
to enjoin the spraying, rather than to recover damages after the
spraying had occurred.
The court, in granting an injunction, first considered the
rights conferred on a power company under a general right of
way. A power company has the right to enter upon the land to
maintain and repair equipment. 8 2 In exercising this right, how-
ever, the company may not inflict unnecessary damage upon the
land or unreasonably increase the burden placed upon the servi-
ent tenement. 83 Thus, although the court recognized the com-
pany's right to enter onto plaintiffs' land to cut and remove trees
and other obstructions which might interfere with the operation
of its equipment, it recognized a myriad of problems, including
pesticide spray drift, lingering fumes after spraying, the potential
to kill broad-leafed plants and to contaminate water sources that
arise from the aerial application of toxic herbicides due to the na-
ture of the chemicals used and the manner of application.' 8 4
Interestingly, the sources of the court's information about
these problems were a law review article,'8 5 cases,' 8 6 and statutes
regulating the use of pesticides.' 8 7 Given these problems, the
court construed the right-of-way agreement allowing the com-
pany to cut and remove trees as not including the right to destroy
all living vegetation within the area sprayed or in adjoining areas
where deadly herbicides could drift.' 88 In ordering that an in-
junction be granted, the court balanced the relative rights of a
grantor-owner of the land and the grantee of the easement:
The power company's right to use technological innova-
tions must be weighed against the right of the grantor-
owner to possess and use the adjacent land and the land
underlying the power lines. The use of aerial broadcast
182. Id. at 454.
183. Id.
184. Kell, 289 S.E.2d 450.
185. Id. at 454-55 (quoting Kennedy, Liability in the Aerial Application of Pesti-
cides, 22 S.D.L. REV. 75, 76 (1977)).
186. Id. (citing Emelwon v. United States, 391 F.2d 9 (5th Cir. 1968));
Binder v. Perkins, 213 Kan. 365, 516 P.2d 1012 (1973); Loe v. Lenhardt, 227 Or.
242, 362 P.2d 312 (1961).
187. Id. at 455 (citing Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act of
1972, 7 U.S.C. § 13 6 -13 6y (1982), and the West Virginia Pesticide Use and Ap-
plication Act, W. VA. CODE § 19-16B-1 to 19-16B-26 (1975)).
188. Kell, 289 S.E.2d at 456.
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spraying of herbicides impermissibly interferes with the
grantor-owner's rights and interests. For example, the
grantor-owner's right to cultivate the land could be nulli-
fied by the use of the herbicides. The power company
cannot indiscriminately wreak havoc upon the owner's
land and its appurtenances in order to exercise its lim-
ited right to protect its lines from danger and hindrance
from overhanging branches and trees. The use of aerial
broadcast spraying of toxic herbicides inflicts unneces-
sary damage on the land. It is not necessary to the main-
tenance or protection of the power company's
equipment to wantonly destroy everything growing in
the proximity of its lines regardless of whether the mat-
ter destroyed poses a danger to the power company's
equipment.
The power company does not have the right... to
destroy vegetation that does not endanger or hinder its
equipment. We, therefore, hold that language in an in-
denture which gives a power company the right to cut
and remove trees, overhanging branches or other ob-
structions that endanger the safety, or interfere with the
use, of the power company's lines on the right-of-way...
does not authorize the power company to apply toxic
herbicides to that right-of-way by aerial broadcast
spraying. 189
Kell is interesting because the court ordered the prevention of dam-
age caused by pesticide application as a matter of law - the court
relied on legal sources in concluding that the spraying could po-
tentially result in an impermissible harm on the plaintiffs. 190
Also, in balancing the relative rights of grantor and grantee, the
court found the grantor's right to be free of pesticides superior to
the power company's right to make use of them.' 9 ' While argua-
bly this balance must be restricted to the facts of Kell, that is,
spraying on an easement, the type of balancing done in Kell also
occurs in the strict liability cases as a matter of law. 192 Thus, the
holding of Kell is, at most, a small step from more traditional case
189. Id. at 456-57.
190. Id. at 454-57.
191. Id. at 457.
192. See supra notes 143-46 and accompanying text.
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law governing the respective rights and duties of adjacent land-
owners spraying pesticides.
4. Conclusion
A number of interrelated themes pervade the cases in which
plaintiffs are able to recover for pesticide-related property dam-
age. First, many of the cases balance a property owner's right to
use pesticides against another's right to be free from pesticide ex-
posure. Although powerful arguments weigh in favor of the user
of pesticides, such as the statutory obligation to keep land free of
pests, the right to make whatever use of land as one sees fit, pro-
tection of growing crops, and the perceived economic advantages
of such protection, most courts have struck the balance in the
neighbor's favor. In so doing, courts have recognized the danger-
ous nature of pesticides and the interest of others to be free from
pesticides and injuries to crops and animals caused by pesticides,
including injury to organic farmers whose products are decerti-
fled as organic.
Second, although some courts define three or four distinct
elements that plaintiff must prove before imposition of liability is
justified, proof of any one element also seems to satisfy the re-
quirements of the other elements. Thus, proof of negligent appli-
cation or demonstration that pesticide application is an
ultrahazardous activity readily leads to the conclusion that pesti-
cides caused plaintiff's loss. Also, sufficient evidence linking
plaintiff's loss to defendant's pesticide allows courts to determine
that the defendant was negligent or that liability may be imposed
without proof of a specific negligent act.
Third, courts often rely on legal sources to conclude that
pesticide use is a dangerous activity and that plaintiff's burden of
recovery for loss caused by that activity should be eased. For ex-
ample, courts view statutes regulating pesticide labeling and use
as expressing a need to protect people, animals, and plant life
from the risk of harm associated with pesticide use. Hence, they
rely-on such statutes to ease plaintiff's burden of proving recov-
ery and, in one case, to enjoin spraying altogether.
Finally, courts are concerned that manufacturers and applica-
tors of pesticides must communicate to those who may be ex-
posed to pesticides information about pesticide-related risks so
that they may take appropriate precautions. Thus, whatever the
benefit of pesticides, they must not be used to deprive others of
their legitimate right to raise animals and crops that may be in-
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compatible with pesticide use. Also, courts have recognized the
responsibilities of manufacturers and sellers as well as applicators
and landowners to ensure that the legitimate interest of others to
be free from pesticide exposure is not infringed.
It is puzzling, however, that the themes pervading property
damage cases have not been applied to many cases involving per-
sonal injury. These cases will now be explored.
B. Recovery for Personal Injury
In general, cases seeking recovery for personal injury result-
ing from pesticide application may be subdivided into two broad
categories. First are "drenching" cases, that is, cases in which an
individual suffers serious injury after exposure to a large amount
of pesticides in a very short period of time and in a manner not
intended by the manufacturer. The second category of cases are
those involving exposure to low levels of pesticides. Drenching
cases have proven easier for courts to resolve than low level expo-
sure cases.
1. Drenching Cases
Drenching cases have been brought against applicators as
well as manufacturers and sellers. The earlier cases seek recovery
in negligence. One example of a drenching case allowing recov-
ery in negligence against an applicator is Lawler v. Skelton.193 In
Lawler, the plaintiff presented substantial evidence that defend-
ant's contractor, who was spraying a cotton crop with a mixture of
malathion and endrin, oversprayed and released the pesticides
over the cotton gin where plaintiff was working.'9 It was undis-
puted that if a person receives an excessive amount of those
chemicals, they can be highly toxic and dangerous to human life;
the container labels, as well as a government aeronautics safety
manual, reflected that endrin and malathion are dangerous to
193. 130 So. 2d 565 (Miss. 1961) (court held that jury verdict was against
overwhelming weight of evidence and remanded case for new trial). The court
in Lawler did not explicitly identify the theory of liability it applied. It does,
however, apply the nondelegation rule, see infra notes 133-42 and accompany-
ing text, which is applicable only to negligence cases. Id. at 569. Thus, the court
believed the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to establish defendants' liabil-
ity on a negligence theory. See also Council v. Duprel, 250 Miss. 269, 165 So. 2d
134 (1964) (plaintiff alleged loss in cotton production caused by application of
herbicides used by defendants, and court, affirming judgment for defendants,
considered only liability premised on theory of negligence).
194. Lawler, 130 So. 2d at 568.
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humans exposed by skin contact, inhalation or swallowing. 195 Im-
mediately after the spraying, the plaintiff became dizzy and nause-
ated, the next day his temperature rose and he went into a coma.
In subsequent months he suffered various illnesses. 196
The court determined that the great weight of the evidence
supported the conclusion that the contractor sprayed the plaintiff
with a chemical mixture and that the spraying was the proximate
cause of the plaintiff's immediate acute illness.' 97 Similarly, in
other cases where a victim has suffered acute symptoms shortly
after a heavy exposure to a pesticide, the toxicity of which is es-
tablished by container labels, government reports or expert testi-
mony, courts have had little difficulty in finding that the exposure
caused the injury and that all the elements of liability have been
established. 198
Drenching cases involving recovery in negligence against ap-
plicators are also noteworthy in extending liability to any party
who might have prevented the heavy exposure. For example, in
Lawler, the court relied on a number of property damage cases to
hold that the defendant could not delegate the work of dusting or
spraying a crop with poisonous insecticides to an independent
contractor.1 99 Similarly, when an employee is exposed to pesti-
cides sprayed by an applicator hired by the plaintiff's employer,
courts have held that the employer is liable for breach of a non-
delegable duty to furnish its employees a safe place to work.2° °
More specifically, these courts have determined that the employ-
ers knew or should have known of the harm from the warning
labels used on the herbicides sprayed and the other evidence es-
tablishing their toxicity. Therefore, these courts have concluded
that the employer was negligent in failing to warn plaintiff of the
presence of a toxic substance in the area and of the dangers and
195. IA at 567.
196. Id. at 567-68.
197. ld at 568.
198. See, e.g., Holladay v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. Co., 255 F.
Supp. 879, 885-86 (S.D. Iowa 1966) (court looked to testimony of several physi-
cians to uphold its conclusion that plaintiff's disease was caused by herbicide
exposure); Tripp v. Choate, 415 S.W.2d 808, 811-12 (Mo. 1967) (court relied
on testimony of physician who treated victim to find that victim was exposed to
DDT and that exposure caused his death).
199. Lawler, 103 So. 2d at 569 (discussing the nondelegation rule estab-
lished in such cases as Heeb v. Frysock, McKennon v. Jones and Crouse v. Wilbure-
Ellis). For discussion of the nondelegation rule, see supra notes 133-42 and ac-
companying text.
200. See, e.g., Holloday, 255 F. Supp. at 883.
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hazards of coming into contact with this substance.20'
Thus, when a victim suffers acute symptoms shortly after a
heavy exposure to a pesticide and the toxicity of the pesticide is
known, courts have little hesitation in finding liability on the part
of the applicator or other responsible party who could have pre-
vented the heavy exposure. 202 These cases, like the property
damage cases, 203 seem to infer causation from the facts of misap-
plication and damage similar to that usually associated with expo-
sure to the product and assume wrongdoing when exposure,
causation, and injury are well established.
Drenching cases are more commonly brought against the
manufacturer of the pesticide. As in property damage cases and
drenching cases against applicators, the courts have found com-
pelling the plaintiff's evidence that exposure to pesticides had
caused injury. Most cases concentrate their discussion on the
standard of care owed by the manufacturer to the plaintiff and
whether that standard was breached. 2°4 In one case, the breach
of the standard of care was established by failure to eliminate the
dangerous character of goods to the extent that the exercise of
reasonable care enables the manufacturer to do so. 20 5 In that
case, the packaging of a dangerous toxic substance in a container
that allowed the victim to mistake it for a jug of water was a
breach of the standard of care.20 6
Most cases, however, base negligence on the theory that "a
manufacturer and seller of a product which, to his actual or con-
structive knowledge, involves danger to users, has a duty to give a
warning of such danger."20 7 Even when a pesticide has some type
201. Id. at 884-85. See also Tripp v. Choate, 415 S.W.2d 808, 811 (Mo.
1967).
202. See, e.g., Farm Servs. Inc. v. Gonzales, 756 S.W.2d 747, 753 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1988).
203. See supra notes 96-132 and accompanying text.
204. See, e.g., Ziglar v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 53 N.C. App. 147,
154, 280 S.E.2d 510, 513 (1981). A few cases have rejected liability on a breach
of warranty theory because, even when the pesticide causes serious bodily injury
after dermal exposure or ingestion, there is no evidence that the product was
not fit for the purposes for which it was sold. See, e.g., Muncy v. Magnolia Chem.
Co., 437 S.W.2d 15, 20 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968); Rumsey v. Freeway Manor
Minimax, 423 S.W.2d 387, 394 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
205. Ziglar, 53 N.C. App. at 155, 280 S.E.2d at 516.
206. Id.
207. Muncy v. Magnolia Chem. Co., 437 S.W.2d 15, 17 (Tex. Civ. App.
1968). Interestingly, the court then quotes section 402A, RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS, comment j, which involves strict products liability, rather than
negligence.
The general duty to warn discussed in Muncy requires a manufacturer to
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of warning label, courts examine whether the label was adequate
to satisfy the duty to warn. 20 8 In undertaking this examination,
many courts deciding drenching cases, like those deciding prop-
erty damage cases, regard federal and state statutes and regula-
tions governing pesticide labeling as setting minimum standards;
the failure to comply with these standards is regarded as negli-
gence per se. "[H]owever mere compliance does not mean the
manufacturer or seller is free from negligence as a matter of
law. . . . [T]he sufficiency of the warning [is] a question of
fact." 20 9
Thus in discussing the contents of the warning required to
avoid negligence liability, some courts have held that the duty to
warn includes a requirement not only to disclose fully the extent
of the danger of a pesticide use, but also to disclose the measures
that may be taken to avoid fatal consequences of its use; if there is
no known antidote, the manufacturer must fully inform the public
of that fact.210 In another case, a court further found that the
label must satisfy the manufacturer's duty to provide directions
for safe use for the purpose intended, for incidental and attend-
ant uses, and for safe disposal. 21'
perform tests to learn about the dangers of a product such as a pesticide; if the
manufacturer does not know of the great danger, it is negligent in marketing a
product which had unknown toxic capabilities. Griffin v. Planters Chem. Corp.,
302 F. Supp. 937, 944 (D.S.C. 1969). It is difficult to distinguish this duty to
warn discussed in negligence law from the duty in strict liability. See, e.g.,
Flamino v. Honda Motor Co., 733 F.2d 463, 467 (7th Cir. 1984); Feldman v.
Lederle Laboratories, 97 N.J. 429, 452, 479 A.2d 374, 387 (1984).
208. See, e.g., Muncy, 437 S.W.2d at 17.
209. Id. at 19. See also Hubbard-Hall Chem. Co. v. Silverman, 340 F.2d 402
(1st Cir. 1965) (affirming judgment for plaintiffs in case where adequacy of
warnings was submitted to jury); Griffin, 302 F. Supp. at 943-44. But see Fitzger-
ald v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 681 F. Supp. 404 (E.D. Mich. 1987) (held that FIFRA's
comprehensive system for registration and labeling of pesticides preempted any
state law tort recovery based on failure to warn theory). The preemptive effect
of FIFRA will be addressed more fully at infra notes 247-62 and accompanying
text.
210. Rumsey, 423 S.W.2d at 393. See also Ziglar, 53 N.C. App. at 159-60, 280
S.E.2d at 518. Similarly, in Griffin, a case in which the plaintiff's death was
caused by the absorption into the body of one percent parathion dust occurring
when a bag of the substance that plaintiff was handling burst, the court held
inadequate a label that had no skull and crossbones, that listed no antidote, and
that did not advise one exposed to call a doctor immediately. Griffin, 302 F.
Supp. at 944.
211. Boyl v. California Chem. Co., 221 F. Supp. 669, 674 (D. Or. 1963). In
Boyl, the manufacturer of a liquid vegetation growth preventative was held liable
in negligence to the plaintiff who suffered acute physical symptoms after she
unwittingly lay stomach down in an area where, five days earlier, she had poured
the rinse water from a container used to apply the herbicide. Id. at 676. The
court described the duty to warn of the manufacturer of a weed killer as follows:
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More recent drenching cases have also awarded recovery to
plaintiffs; however, the theory of recovery usually has been strict
products liability rather than negligence. For example, in Villari
v. Terminix International, Inc.,212 plaintiffs contracted with the de-
fendant to treat their home for termite control. In performing
the treatment using a termiticide known as Aldrin, a chlorinated
hydrocarbon that has been banned for residential use in some
states, the defendant spilled a quantity of Aldrin in the plaintiffs'
basement and made efforts to remove the spill using the plaintiffs'
household mops and rags. All members of plaintiffs' family suf-
fered headaches, nausea, dizziness, and general malaise. Air sam-
pling tests performed later revealed airborne levels of Aldrin in
excess of safety levels set by the National Academy of Sciences. 213
The court held that plaintiffs' allegations, that defendant sold or
distributed unreasonably dangerous insecticides and failed to
warn of the danger, stated a claim for strict liability under section
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts:
Under section 402A, a product may be defective because
it fails to carry warnings concerning the risks of foresee-
able improper uses. The Villaris have, in our view,
presented sufficient evidence to permit a reasonable jury
to infer that Aldrin is hazardous if inhaled, that Aldrin
was introduced into their home without proper warnings
as to that danger, and that Aldrin is defective as a prod-
uct in the absence of proper warnings.2 14
The warnings required under strict liability are practically indis-
tinguishable from those required in negligence as discussed
So, today a manufacturer who undertakes to produce and sell to
the general public a product with high risk of human harm must pro-
vide specification, instruction, and warning, so that it is reasonably safe
for ordinary persons to use it, not only for the purposes for which it is
produced and intended to be used but also all other necessarily inciden-
tal and attendant uses (such as storage or disposal) and to give reason-
able notice and warning of after or delayed effect or latent or lingering
dangers not known or reasonably to be expected by the ordinary user,
but which are "foreseeably probable" to the manufacturer with his
expertise.
Id. at 674 (footnote omitted). The manufacturer's liability was premised on its
failure to provide advice on the disposal of the rinse which could mislead a user
to conclude that there was no lingering risk. Id. at 676.
212. 663 F. Supp. 727 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (opinion is also published at 677 F.
Supp. 330).
213. Id. at 728-29.
214. Id. at 729.
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above,2 15 except that the court does not engage in the fiction that
the manufacturer must have knowledge or constructive knowl-
edge of the dangers of which it must warn; the court assumes that
the existence of the danger triggers a duty, the breach of which
triggers liability. 2 16
Thus, drenching cases resulting in personal injury are similar
to property damage cases in that proof of causation seems almost
automatic when plaintiff proves that the pesticide was misapplied
and that he or she suffered symptoms usually associated with ex-
cessive exposure. Also, when the plaintiff presents compelling
evidence that plaintiff's exposure to defendant's pesticide caused
the plaintiff's injury, courts have readily concluded that the expo-
sure was caused by defendant's negligence or ease plaintiff's bur-
den of proving negligence by applying strict liability. Because of
the inherently dangerous nature of pesticides, courts have im-
posed on manufacturers and sellers liability, not only for failure
to eliminate the dangerous nature of the product, but also for fail-
ure to adequately warn the user of dangers of and proper instruc-
tion for use of the product and for failure to inform of antidotes,
215. See supra notes 165-78 and accompanying text.
216. Indeed, in Muncy, discussed supra note 187[old numbering] and ac-
companying text, the court cites section 402A in support of its negligence analy-
sis. This type of strict liability should not be confused with the theory of strict
liability for an ultrahazardous activity adopted in such cases as Loe v. Lenhardt, see
supra notes 139, 147-49 and accompanying text. As explained by the court in
Villari, that type of strict liability does not accurately reflect the relationship be-
tween the parties:
One of the central purposes of ... strict liability [for an ultrahazardous
activity] is to assure that those receiving the benefits of dangerous but
essential activities insure against the costs those activities impose on
others....
The Villaris have attempted to bring their claim under this theory
by asserting that application of Aldrin was an activity engaged in by
Terminix for its own economic benefit, and that the costs of the activity
should be borne by Terminix rather than by the Villaris. But this char-
acterization of the transaction is, in our view, unrealistic. Homeowners
contract for termite protection in order to reduce damage to, and safe-
guard the economic value of, their homes. We see no rationale under
this theory of liability for requiring a contractor to insure against costs
to a homeowner which are caused by an activity requested by that
homeowner for the protection of that homeowner's own property.
Legal theories that more accurately reflect the relationship between the
parties-including strict products liability under section 402A-are, in
our view, better suited to the claim at hand.
663 F. Supp. at 732 (citations omitted). See also First Nat'l Bank v. Nor-Am Agri-
cultural Prods., Inc., 88 N.M. 74, 537 P.2d 682 (1975) (in action seeking recov-
ery from manufacturer of liquid seed disinfectant used by defendant grain
processor to treat seed, ingested by hog and causing injury to children who later
ate hog, court rejected theory of strict liability for ultrahazardous activity in
favor of strict products liability).
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so that users have an opportunity to avoid the risks associated
with use of the product.
2. Low Level Exposure Cases
As documented in the medical literature surveyed in Part II,
lower levels of exposure to pesticides may also result in a myriad
of symptoms or physiological changes, some of which may not be
noticed by the exposed person at the time of exposure. Docu-
mented effects include cancer, chromosomal damage, birth de-
fects, neurological defects, and blood disorders. These changes
may occur over a long period of time and when they are finally
manifested clinically, it may not be possible to trace them back to
pesticide exposure.
Cases brought by individuals subjected to lower levels of ex-
posure reflect this difficulty in detecting injury at the time of ex-
posure and in linking clinical symptoms to the exposure. Courts
address cases involving exposure to lower levels of pesticides in
the same way as drenching cases. Hence, in order to recover, a
plaintiff must show that the defendant's conduct was negligent
and that the negligence caused plaintiff's injury. However, in low
level exposure cases, unlike drenching and property damage
cases, plaintiffs have considerable difficulty in establishing proof
of an actual injury and, when the injury is evident, proof that in-
jury was caused by exposure to the pesticide. Moreover, plaintiffs
may experience difficulty in satisfying a court that some standard
of care has been breached. Even when strict products liability is
applied in lieu of negligence, courts may be precluded from hold-
ing that a pesticide has inadequate warnings and is defective as a
product because a number of jurisdictions have held that FIFRA
preempts such claims.
With respect to proof of injury, some effects of low level ex-
posure may only be detected by laboratory tests. For example,
chromosomal damage has been found in agricultural workers who
were symptomless. The effects of such chromosomal damage
may not be manifested for years and in some cases not until the
birth of offspring with birth defects. Even when exposure to a
particular pesticide is known to result in birth defects among a
certain percentage of the offspring of the exposed population, it
is unknown which members of the exposed population will give
birth to children with pesticide-related defects until that event
materializes; at most it can be said that the members of the ex-
posed group are "at risk" of giving birth to children with defects.
1990] 409
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However, a plaintiff who has not suffered an acute physical injury
but whose injuries consist of subclinical changes or increased risk
of developing carcinogenesis, teratogenesis or mutagenesis is un-
likely to recover in a legal action.
A typical case involving such low level exposure is Rabb v.
Orkin Exterminating Co. ,217 a case involving plaintiffs' exposure to
termiticides present in their home. The termiticides contained
chlordane and heptachlor which were subsequently withdrawn
from the market. 218 The evidence in Rabb, however, supported a
finding that at the time of application in plaintiffs' home, the de-
fendant had adhered to specifications on the EPA-approved
termiticide label in applying the termiticides at plaintiffs' resi-
dence. 219 Evidently, plaintiffs had failed to satisfy the jury that
they suffered from a present physical injury and therefore the
court held that the plaintiffs offered insufficient evidence that they
suffered an increased risk of future disease:
[I]n a personal injury action, the verdict may include
only such future damages as "reasonably certain will of
necessity" result in the future from the injury. The "rea-
sonably certain" rule has been described as one "which
manifestly and logically will reasonably come to pass,
and not a mere possibility or probability." It is a conse-
quence "which follows the original act complained of in
the usual, ordinary, and experienced course of
events.". . . [P]laintiffs' failure to establish that they
-most probably" would suffer from any of the unspeci-
fied diseases which they claimed might be suffered in the
future was fatal to their increased risk claim which was
properly excluded. 220
Consistent with other cases involving exposure to toxicants, the
court upheld the rejection of plaintiffs' increased risk claim in the
absence of evidence favoring a greater than 50% chance that a
future consequence will occur.2 2' The following expresses the at-
217. 677 F. Supp. 424 (1977). This opinion denied plaintiffs' motions for a
directed verdict and a new trial after a jury returned a verdict in favor of the
defendant. Id. at 430.
218. Id. at 426.
219. Id.
220. Id. (citations omitted).
221. Rabb, 667 F. Supp. at 427 (citing Lohrmann v. Pittsburgh Coming
Corp., 782 F.2d 1156, 1160 (4th Cir. 1986). See also Jackson v. Johns-Manville
Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394 (5th Cir. 1986); Gideon v.Johns-Manville Sales Corp.,
761 F.2d 1129, 1136-37 (5th Cir. 1985).
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titude of most courts to evidence of increased risk of developing
disease:
The developments at the very frontier of science do
not provide reasonably probable predictions. There is
no definitive epidemiological evidence to verify the
mathematical calculation of quantitative risk assessment.
While the animal test results and in vitro studies present
the possibility that DBCP [Dibromochloropropane] may
be a human carcinogen, such an extrapolation does not
reach the requisite level of acceptance within the scien-
tific community to justify legal reliance. To award dam-
ages based on a mere mathematical probability would
significantly undercompensate those who actually do de-
velop cancer and would be a windfall to those who do
not.
There has always existed a considerable lag between
advances and discoveries in scientific fields and their ac-
ceptance as evidence in a court proceeding....
[T]hejury in this case could not have sufficient relia-
ble date regarding risk assessment of these various plain-
tiffs to make an intelligent award. They would be
required to speculate on future developments without
the reliable prediction or degree of certainty required by
our system of tort law.222
Thus, according to this court, ajury cannot be permitted to assess
cancer risk where the scientific community cannot yet do so;
therefore, the court ruled that as a matter of law the risk of cancer
is not a proper element of damages for the jury to assess. 223
Some earlier cases showed more flexibility in allowing recovery for the risk
of future disease. For example, in 1930 a California court upheld ajury award of
$10,000 to a plaintiff who had an increased risk of cancer as a result of overexpo-
sure to X-rays. Coover v. Painless Parker, Dentist, 105 Cal. App. 110, 111, 286
P. 1048, 1050 (1930). In this case, a doctor testified that it was common for
cancer to develop after exposure of this type. The court stated the following:
The record contains positive evidence that a condition actually ex-
ists which makes this dread disease much more likely. We think this
predisposition in itself is some damage .... The necessity of constantly
watching and guarding against cancer, as testified to by the physician, is
an obligation and a burden that the defendant had no right to inflict
upon the plaintiff.
Id. at 115, 286 P. at 1054. This need to watch and guard against cancer is the
kind of burden forced upon individuals exposed to some forms of pesticide.
Most courts today, however, apply the "50%" rule discussed in Rabb.
222. Arnett v. Dow Chem. Co., No. 82-9015, slip op. (Cal. Mar. 21, 1983).
223. Id. at D-.
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Some plaintiffs, recognizing the difficulty of recovering for
increased risk, have tried to recover for their fear of future dis-
ease. This claim has met with some success by plaintiffs who have
been exposed to substances whose long term health effects have
been generally recognized in the medical and scientific commu-
nity.224 However, plaintiffs exposed to low levels of pesticides
have not been successful. For example, in Rabb, the court held
that in the absence of evidence of present injury or evidence that
there was a greater than 50% chance that plaintiffs will develop a
disease resulting from their termiticide exposure, exclusion of ev-
idence of plaintiffs' fear of future disease was proper.225
Courts allow recovery for mental anguish or emotional dis-
tress in three situations: (1) for severe and extreme distress
caused by "outrageous conduct;" (2) for a bystander who is a wit-
ness to a traumatic event; and (3) for pain and suffering attendant
to some physical injury when the fear and condition are reason-
ably certain to occur. The purpose of these requirements is to
provide sufficient guaranties of genuineness before cases proceed
to the jury.226 The court in Rabb concluded that the plaintiffs
failed to present evidence of any of the three situations. 227 In
most low level pesticide exposure cases, it will be difficult to sat-
isfy a court that one of these situations is present.228 Although
some may view the registration process under FIFRA as flawed, a
court is unlikely to find outrageous conduct by a manufacturer
who followed that process and by an applicator who followed the
label directions. Moreover, low level pesticide exposure is not
the type of sudden occurrence that courts consider a traumatic
event;22 9 further, physical injury remains difficult to establish.
In cases where an applicator misapplies a pesticide, a few
224. See, e.g.,Jackson, 781 F.2d at 415 (asbestos); Gideon, 761 F.2d at 1138
(asbestos); Dartez v. Fibreboard Corp., 765 F.2d 456, 468 (5th Cir. 1985) (asbes-
tos); Hagerty v. L & L Marine Servs., Inc., 788 F.2d 315 (5th Cir. 1986) (dri-
polene, a chemical containing benzene, toluene, and xylene); McAdams v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 638 F. Supp. 1173 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (DES); In re Moorenovich, 634 F.
Supp. 634 (D. Me. 1986) (asbestos).
225. Rabb, 677 F. Supp. at 427.
226. See Ackerson v. Dow Chem. Co., No. 808161, slip. op. (Cal. Super. Ct.,
S.F. County, Apr. 4, 1989).
227. Id. at -. See also Gergel v. Chemlawn Servs. Corp., No. 87-1138,
slip op. at 4-6 (E.D. Pa. July 5, 1988).
228. See Ackerson (despite evidence that DBCP is carcinogenic in animals,
that DBCP has been banned and causes male sterility, claims of workers exposed
to DBCP for fear of cancer was dismissed). Cf. Arnett v. Dow Chem. Co., S.F.
Master File No. 729586 (plaintiffs with verifiable claims of sterility able to pro-
ceed with fear of cancer claims).
229. See, e.g., Wisniewski v. Johns-Manville Corp., 812 F.2d 81 (3d Cir.
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courts have shown a willingness to bend the rules. For example,
Laxton v. Orkin Exterminating Co. ,230 involved negligent application
of chlordane which resulted in contamination of plaintiffs' water
supply. The court wrote in pertinent part:
Here it is undisputed that the plaintiffs ingested pol-
luted water when the defendants negligently permitted
dangerous chemicals to infiltrate plaintiffs' household
water supply. The plaintiffs needed and obtained medi-
cal services after using the spring. There is no question
as to the reasonableness of the medical expenses. Nor is
there any claim that the expenses were not necessary
under the circumstances. The chemical which polluted
their spring was a possible carcinogen. Even though the
tests proved negative, in our opinion a jury could find
sufficient "injury" to these plaintiffs to justify a recovery
for their natural concern and anxiety for the welfare of
themselves and of their infant children.23 '
Hence, recovery for negligent infliction of mental anguish was
upheld when a plaintiff has ingested an indefinite amount of a
harmful substance; the finder of fact may conclude that the plain-
tiff has sustained sufficient physical injury to support an award for
mental anguish even if subsequent medical diagnosis fails to re-
veal any other physical injury.232 Similarly, in Villari v. Terminix,233
testimony regarding the plaintiff's headaches, nausea, dizziness,
and general malaise in the month following misapplication of a
termiticide was sufficient to support a products liability claim
against the applicator.234 This testimony also satisfied the re-
quirement of physical symptoms to support a claim for negligent
infliction of emotional distress due to fear of the consequences of
exposure to hazardous termiticides and a claim for the costs of
future medical surveillance.2 3 5
Courts have also experienced difficulty deciding what plain-
tiffs must show in order to prove that their exposure to pesticides
was the cause of injury. This difficulty reflects the scientific un-
1987) (court affirmed dismissal of mental distress claims of widow and children
of asbestos worker whose slow and painful death they observed).
230. 639 S.W.2d 431 (Tenn. 1982).
231. Id. at 434.
232. Id.
233. 663 F. Supp. 727, 729 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
234. Id. at 729.
235. Id. at 734-35.
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certainty in this area, the disagreement over the relevance of in
vitro and animal studies to human exposures, and the problem
that symptoms such as muscle aches, nausea, and headaches have
a myriad of causes other than pesticide exposure. In addition,
many studies linking pesticide exposure to particular diseases
show an increased incidence of disease over background levels in
the exposed population, but do not establish that a particular in-
dividual's disease was caused by the pesticide exposure.
Perhaps the leading pesticide exposure case where evidence
of causation was sufficient is Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical Co. 236 Fer-
ebee involved an action brought by the estate of an agricultural
worker, who allegedly developed pulmonary fibrosis and died as a
result of long-term skin exposure to diluted solutions of paraquat,
a herbicide distributed by the defendant. Despite an apparent ab-
sence of animal or epidemiological studies clearly establishing a
cause-effect relationship, plaintiffs presented two expert witnesses
who testified that paraquat poisoning was the cause of Ferebee's
illness and death. The court held that this testimony was based
on well-founded methodologies and was sufficient to support
plaintiffs' verdict.23 7 However, many courts are less willing to ad-
mit as evidence controversial diagnoses of the cause-effect rela-
tionship between pesticide exposure and plaintiff's injuries. 23
As with regard to proof of present injury, courts seem willing
to deem the evidence of causation sufficient where it can pinpoint
some wrongful conduct on the part of the manufacturer or appli-
cator. For example, in Bandura v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 239 plain-
tiffs presented evidence that defendant falsely led plaintiffs to
believe that their home was termite infested to induce their
purchase of exterminator's services. The court easily upheld the
jury's decision that exposure to chlordane and heptachlor caused
plaintiffs' symptoms. 240 Also, in Gonzalez v. Virginia Carolina Chemi-
236. 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
237. Id. at 1535-36. See also Peteet v. Dow Chem. Co., 868 F.2d 1428 (5th
Cir. 1989); Bandura v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 664 F. Supp. 1218, 1219 (N.D.
Ill. 1987).
238. See, e.g., Skogen v. Dow Chem. Co., 375 F.2d 692, 706 (8th Cir. 1967)
(court upheld finding that brain damage was caused by viral encephalitis rather
than organo-phosphate poisoning from insecticide was supported by the evi-
dence); Gergel, slip op. at 6; Diaz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 14 Mass. App. Ct. 448, 440
N.E.2d 518 (1982) (unusual or controversial diagnoses of cause-effect relation-
ship between exposure to pesticide and plaintiff's blindness inadmissible).
239. 664 F. Supp. 1218 (N.D. Ill. 1987).
240. Id. at 1219.
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cal Co. ,241 the court had little difficulty concluding that plaintiff's
exposure to defendant's defoliant caused his acute symptoms
where the defendant-manufacturer distributed a dangerous
poison without adequate tests and warning of its toxicity in viola-
tion of federal and state statutes regulating pesticide labeling and
without communicating a protective antidote for the toxic
substance. 242
Thus, given that scientists disagree about the health effects of
low level pesticide exposure, the difficulties of demonstrating
these effects and the court's requirement that a high level of cer-
tainty be shown before the elements of injury and causation will
be satisfied, plaintiffs subjected to low level pesticide exposure
have experienced difficulty in obtaining compensation. Courts
have shown some willingness to lower this level of certainty in
cases against manufacturers who have distributed pesticides with
labels that fail to conform to statutory requirements and against
applicators who fail to follow label directions or accepted prac-
tices. However, for a number of reasons, these failures are likely
to be rare, even though individuals may be exposed to unnecessa-
rily high and potentially unsafe levels of pesticides. With respect
to a manufacturer's failure to warn, many cases against pesticide
manufacturers premise liability on the manufacturer's failure to
warn of the product's danger, to adequately inform or instruct
about its use and disposal or to provide adequate information in
the event of excessive exposure. Additionally, some courts have
found that failure to comply with statutory or regulatory require-
ments is negligence per se.243 Presumably, manufacturers will
comply with the FIFRA registration process before placing pesti-
cides on the market and, thus, will be in compliance with statutory
requirements.
Registration does not, however, mean that a particular pesti-
cide is safe or useful. Some courts have recognized that compli-
ance with FIFRA does not preclude an examination of the
adequacy of a label. The leading case is Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical
Co. ,244 discussed above. Despite EPA approval of paraquat and its
label, the court examined the adequacy of the warning and ob-
served that the label indicated only that dermal contact could
cause severe skin irritation and therefore failed to warn of possi-
241. 239 F. Supp. 567 (E.D.S.C. 1965).
242. Id. at 573.
243. See supra notes 110-16, 172-73 and accompanying text.
244. 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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ble long term lung disease resulting in death. Moreover, the
court expressed no doubt that during the time Ferebee applied
paraquat, 1977 to 1979, it was known that paraquat exposure
could lead to fibrotic disease and that the pesticide could lead to
fibrotic lung disease upon entry into the body.
Indeed, the manufacturer had knowledge of incidents in
1976 of paraquat exposure causing serious injury including lung
disease and death. 245 The manufacturer of paraquat had a duty
to warn of dangers which it knew or should have known during
Ferebee's exposure. Based on the evidence presented, the court
upheld the jury's finding that as of the last date of Ferebee's ex-
posure, Chevron's knowledge of the link between dermal para-
quat exposure and lung disease was sufficient to require a more
detailed label and that the inadequate labeling caused Ferebee's
disease. 246
Despite the evidence, Chevron argued that the jury verdict
should be overturned because EPA approval of paraquat and its
label under FIFRA required the jury to find the label adequate
and that federal law preempts state common law actions based on
inadequate labeling. The court noted that FIFRA's provisions
precluded EPA authorization of a pesticide unless the product, as
labeled, would not cause "unreasonable adverse effects on the en-
vironment." 247 The court concluded, however, that while FIFRA
aims at ensuring that, from a cost-benefit point of view, paraquat
as labeled does not produce "unreasonable adverse effects on the
environment," state tort law, having in contrast, broader compen-
satory goals, may deem a label inadequate despite its sufficiency
under a cost-benefit standard if it nonetheless fails to warn
against any significant risk. Absent Congressional intent to the
contrary, states are free to perform their own cost-benefit balanc-
ing and may tip the scales more heavily in favor of the health of its
citizens than EPA is permitted to by FIFRA.24 8
The court did not find the necessary Congressional intent to
preempt state tort failure to warn cases. Although, a provision of
245. Id. at 1537.
246. Id. at 1536, 1538-39. See also supra notes 162-73 and accompanying
text.
247. Id. at 1539 (quoting FIFRA § 3(c)(5)(C), 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(5)(C)).
FIFRA defines these effects as follows: "[A]ny unreasonable risk to man or envi-
ronment, taking into account the economic, social, and environmental costs and
benefits of the use of [the] pesticide." FIFRA § 2(bb), 7 U.S.C. § 136(bb).
248. Ferebee, 736 F.2d at 1540. See also Hubbard-Hall Chem. Co. v. Sil-
verman, 340 F.2d 402, 405 (1st Cir. 1965).
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FIFRA prohibits a state from imposing or continuing "in effect
any requirements for labeling ... in addition to or different from
those required under this subchapter, ' 249 the regulatory aim of
FIFRA, to assure that adequate labels are used, does not displace
the compensatory aims of tort law. Moreover, FIFRA's aims do
not displace a judgment of a jury that as between a manufacturer
and an injured party the manufacturer ought to bear the cost of
compensating for those injuries that could have been prevented
with a label more detailed than that approved by the EPA.
Moreover, the court observed that section 136v(b) not only
limits state action with regard to labeling, but allows more strin-
gent constraints on the use of EPA-approved pesticides 250 and
therefore a state's power to regulate use can include the require-
ment of compensating for injuries resulting from use of a pesti-
cide. Finally, the court noted that if an EPA-approved label does
not adequately convey information about risks associated with use
of a pesticide, which may result in a manufacturer's liability to
injured users, manufacturers may petition EPA to allow more de-
tailed labeling of their products.25'
This last point was elaborated in Cox v. Velsicol Chemical
Corp. ,252 an action by the estate of a pest control operator alleging
that the decedent developed lung cancer as a result of exposure
to defendant's chlordane products and that the manufacturer of
chlordane failed to give adequate warnings about the risks associ-
ated with use of its products. 253 In rejecting the manufacturer's
argument that FIFRA preempted the plaintiffs' action, the court
noted the significant role the manufacturer plays in the regulatory
scheme of FIFRA. Each manufacturer drafts for each product a
warning label for EPA approval, thus creating the possibility that
two manufacturers of the same product will choose different la-
bels. The fact that manufacturers submit their own labels implies
a duty to provide a label that gives adequate warnings about the
249. Ferebee, 736 F.2d at 1540 (quoting FIFRA § 24(b), 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b)).
250. Id. at 1541 (citing FIFRA § 24(a), 7 U.S.C. § 136v(a) and National Ag-
ricultural Chems. Ass'n v. Rominger, 500 F. Supp. 465 (E.D. Cal. 1978)). Simi-
lar conclusions were reached in Chemical Specialties Mfrs. Ass'n, Inc. v. Lowery,
452 F.2d 431 (2d Cir. 1971) (earlier version of FIFRA did not preempt local
regulations governing classification and labeling of pressurized products); Whit-
ener v. Reilly Indus. Inc., No. 87-5225 slip op. (S.D. Ill. Oct. 25, 1989); Roberts
v. Dow Chem. Co., 702 F. Supp. 195 (N.D. Ill. 1988); Wilson v. Chevron Chem.
Co., No. 83 Civ. 762 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 1986) (1986 WL 14925).
251. Ferebee, 736 F.2d at 1541.
252. 704 F. Supp. 85 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
253. Id. at 86.
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risks associated with the product's use, notwithstanding the ap-
proval of the EPA. Hence, the court concluded that Congress in-
tended FIFRA to set minimum standards. 254
Roberts v. Chemlawn Corp.255 expressed another reason why
EPA labeling requirements should merely be viewed as setting
minimum standards. In Roberts, the manufacturer of lawn care
pesticides that allegedly caused a variety of ill-health effects to the
pesticide-sensitive plaintiff, urged that the court should defer to
the EPA's primary jurisdiction and require the plaintiff to utilize
EPA's special review procedure in lieu of a judicial remedy.256
The court rejected this argument:
As far as this court can tell, the EPA will not com-
plete its assessment of non-agricultural pesticides until
the beginning of the next century. The EPA's expedited
review program (special review) appears backlogged as
well. According to GAO estimates, "[s]pecial reviews
completed through October 1986 have generally taken
two to six years or longer to complete." And while the
special review process has allegedly been expedited, we
question whether that action will significantly reduce the
duration of the proceedings given the increased work-
load of the special review branch. Our fears appear con-
firmed by those in a position to know: "The Chief of
EPA's Special Review branch told us [the GAO] that,
while special reviews have taken too long, it is difficult to
speed up the special review process when EPA is dealing
with so much uncertainty with respect to quality of risks
and benefits data, and with competing resource demands
from other pesticide program activities. 2
57
Despite the sound reasons why it is appropriate for state tort
law to be more protective of human health than FIFRA, a recent
case has reconsidered the precedent set by Ferebee. In Fitzgerald v.
Mallinckrodt, Inc.,258 a case involving a greenskeeper who spilled
254. Id. at 86-87.
255. 716 F. Supp. 364 (N.D. I11. 1989).
256. Id. at 365-66.
257. Id. at 365-66, (citation omitted) (footnote omitted). Using similar rea-
soning the court refused to require plaintiff to exhaust administrative remedies.
Id. at 368-69. But see Ryan v. Chemlawn Corp., 29 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1415
(N.D. Ill. 1989) (court dismissed complaint in deference to EPA's primaryjuris-
diction; resolution of issues involve command of arcane technical data, uniquely
within EPA's competence).
258. 681 F. Supp. 404 (E.D. Mich. 1987).
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an inorganic mercury based fungicide on himself, the court re-
viewed the provisions of FIFRA considered in Ferebee.259 The
court concluded that FIFRA's comprehensive system for the re-
gistration and labeling of pesticides preempted state tort law re-
covery.2 60 The court reasoned that the express prohibition of
state imposition of additional or different labeling or packaging
requirements imposed by section 136v(b) preempted state regu-
lation; therefore, allowing tort recovery would be "back door"
regulation. Specifically, the court stated that "any state law tort
recovery based on a failure to warn theory would abrogate Con-
gress' intent to provide uniform regulations governing the label-
ing of pesticides. " 261
Other courts have placed additional limitations on recovery
against a manufacturer by one exposed to a hazardous pesticide.
For example, in Stiltjes v. Ridco Exterminating Co. ,262 not only did
the court hold that a pesticide manufacturer satisfied its tort duty
to warn by meeting the FIFRA labeling requirement, the court
also held that by restricting sales only to licensed commercial ap-
plicators, a manufacturer has no duty to provide instructions or
warnings to individuals. The court reasoned that the applicators
are, as a matter of law, charged with knowledge of the dangers
associated with and safe use of pesticides; therefore, the manufac-
turer has no further duty to warn the applicator's customers. 263
This reasoning is troublesome because it ignores the control
manufacturers have over the contents of the label.2 64 Also, a pes-
ticide applicator gains a substantial part of his expertise in the
field from his manufacturer or supplier rather than from in-
dependent sources. 265 An applicator may know no more than
what the manufacturer chooses to communicate to him directly
and through the regulatory process, and may not have additional
259. See supra notes 247-51 and accompanying text.
260. Fitzgerald, 681 F. Supp. at 408.
261. Id. at 407. The court's opinion follows Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc.,
825 F.2d 620 (1st Cir. 1987), which held that the federal Cigarette Labelling Act
preempted state tort actions against cigarette manufacturers premised on the
manufacturers failure to warn of the risks associated with cigarette smoking.
262. 178 Ga. App. 438, 343 S.E.2d 715 (1986), aff'd. 256 Ga. 255, 347
S.E.2d 568 (1986) (Supreme Court opinion substituted for Opinion of Court of
Appeals, 180 Ga. App. 700, 350 S.E.2d 856 (1986)).
263. Stiljes, 343 S.E.2d at 719. See also Dine v. Western Exterminating Co.,
Civ. No. 86-1857-OG (D.D.C. March 9, 1988) (1988 WL 25511).
264. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
265. For example, a certified applicator may not be required to demon-
strate knowledge of integrated pest management. See supra notes 51-52 and ac-
companying text.
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information to communicate to customers. Moreover, one cannot
assume that simply because a commercial applicator has "knowl-
edge" of the risks associated with use of a pesticide, that knowl-
edge is possessed by its employees. 266 Thus, one court has
concluded that at the very least a pesticide manufacturer must la-
bel containers that reach the hands of an applicator's employees
to inform of hazards and safe use.267
Thus, plaintiffs seeking recovery against manufacturers on a
failure to warn theory may have difficulty when the manufacturer
uses an EPA-approved label that fails to communicate all risks as-
sociated with use of the pesticide and that may never reach the
person likely to be exposed, such as an applicator's employee or
customer. For similar reasons, it may be difficult to show that an
applicator following accepted practices misapplied a pesticide
even when people are exposed to unnecessarily high levels of pes-
ticides. As discussed earlier, pesticides are being used in ever in-
creasing amounts, and surprisingly high levels are being
measured off-target. The medical literature is filled with exam-
ples of high incidence of disease associated with pesticide expo-
sure. It is questionable whether generally accepted practices
adequately protect the environment and public health, and in-
deed there are instances, as illustrated in Rabb, where individuals
are exposed to a pesticide that is subsequently withdrawn from
the market because of safety concerns. Nonetheless, a court in
such a situation is reluctant to find that a pesticide was misapplied
when the label specifications have been followed.
The cases involving low level pesticide exposure are trouble-
some in several respects. First, unlike many property damage
cases which regard statutes regulating pesticide labeling as sup-
port for the dangerousness of pesticides and, at best, as providing
minimum standards for labeling and use, there is a growing body
of case law holding that FIFRA preempts more protective case
law.
Second, unlike property damage cases that impose a broad
duty on manufacturers, sellers, and applicators to inform, cases
involving personal injury have restricted the scope of the manu-
266. Khan v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 711 S.W.2d 310, 313, 315-16 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1986).
267. Id. at 316. See also Whitener v. Reilly Indus. Inc., No. 87-5224, slip op.
(S.D. Ill. Oct. 25, 1989) (court refused to extend learned intermediary doctrine,
which exonerates from liability drug manufacturers who give warnings, to pre-
scribing physicians to situation when pesticide manufacturer communicates
warning to employer).
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facturers' duty to warn and refused to safeguard an individual's
interest in remaining free from the health risks associated with
pesticide exposure. Unlike cases that recognize an individual's in-
terest to be free from the risk to property associated with pesti-
cide exposure, courts addressing personal injury cases seem more
concerned that manufacturers and applicators are not overregu-
lated. This trend is particularly disturbing, because manufactur-
ers of pesticides control the process of testing for safety and the
contents of the labeling with minimal oversight from the EPA, de-
spite the protective language of FIFRA.
Third, unlike the body of case law that infers causation from
some misconduct by the defendant and proof of damage of a type
associated with exposure to the pesticide, courts dealing with per-
sonal injury have been reluctant to ease plaintiff's burden of
proving causation. A reason for this different treatment may be
that in many property damage cases, the harm was caused by an
herbicide such as 2,4-D, which damaged crops. Thus, the herbi-
cide was having its desired and recognized effect, albeit in the
wrong place. Issues of causation were not difficult to resolve. In
cases involving personal injury, the herbicides and insecticides at
issue were designed and developed to have effects on specific
plants and insect pests, not on humans. These desired effects be-
ing known, the pesticides were applied by the user who had no
knowledge of other undesired effects that the pesticide might have.
It is these effects of pesticides, unrelated to their designed uses,
that set the issue of personal injury apart from the issue of un-
wanted crop damage - at least in terms of causation. However,
despite the understandable difficulty courts have in linking pesti-
cide exposure to particular personal injuries, their unwillingness
to ease plaintiffs' burdens of proof is disturbing because the man-
ufacturers control the development of information regarding
health risks and its release of that information to the public.
These rulings provide no incentives for manufacturers of pesti-
cides to go beyond the necessary minimum or to develop infor-
mation regarding health risks associated with pesticide exposure
and to release this information to the public.
IV. CONCLUSION
The cases that discuss remedies for exposure to pesticides
seem to make several assumptions. First, the cases appear to as-
sume that pesticides are generally useful. For example, even the
property damage cases that ease plaintiff's burden of proof to re-
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cover for crop loss caused by spray drift do not question the de-
fendant-landowner's right to use "beneficial dusts and sprays" to
rid his land of pests. However, studies are increasingly demon-
strating that comparable productivity can be achieved without
synthetic chemical pesticides. Moreover, the regulatory process
does not necessarily require an applicant for registration of a pes-
ticide to demonstrate efficacy. Thus, the benefits of pesticides are
subject to question.
Second, courts assume that when used according to label di-
rections, pesticides can be used safely. However, the current reg-
ulatory structure basically places in the hands of the registrant
responsibility for determining the safety of the pesticide and the
types of warnings and directions for safe use to be placed on the
label. EPA cannot replicate these studies. Even if it can be as-
sumed that current registrants follow accepted protocol in devel-
oping data, data demonstrating ill-health effects may take many
years to develop, during which time the pesticide is on the mar-
ket. Older pesticides subject to re-registration may never have
been subject to adequate safety tests. Indeed, the medical litera-
ture is replete with instances where long term exposure to regis-
tered pesticides has been linked to serious injury despite
compliance with label directions. 268 Thus, the assumption that
pesticides can be used safely is also questionable.
Courts should recognize that they are making these question-
able assumptions and, in cases involving human exposure, should
allow plaintiffs to present evidence that challenges these assump-
tions. The property damage cases have already evolved doctrines
that compensate, in a fairly straightforward fashion, for property
loss caused by neighboring pesticide use. These cases recognize
that a plaintiff's interest in property includes the right to use that
property free from pesticide exposure. Langan goes so far as to
hold that an organic farmer's decision to grow organic crops can-
not be interfered with, even when no traditional crop loss has oc-
curred. Kell goes one step further and allows the grantor of an
easement to prevent exposure of his land to pesticides. In cases
of human exposure, courts should similarly recognize that one's
right to use and enjoyment of property includes the right to be
free from the health risks associated with exposure to pesticides
used on neighboring land, particularly in light of the questionable
benefits and safety of pesticides.
268. See supra notes 91-95 and accompanying text.
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Indeed, current nuisance law could accommodate evidence
concerning the risk of developing serious bodily injury in decid-
ing whether pesticide spraying is a nuisance given the risk of drift
onto neighboring lands. An action in private nuisance arises from
a defendant's interference with plaintiff's use or enjoyment of
land. 269 There is support for the proposition that a threat of fu-
ture injury may be a present menace and interference with enjoy-
ment and is an actionable basis for a nuisance.2 70 At least one
court has recognized that, in a nuisance action, even when plain-
tiffs have not been diagnosed with a disease, damages for incon-
venience, discomfort and annoyance resulting from exposure to a
hazardous substance on defendant's property are recoverable. 27'
Thus, where the spraying of pesticides on neighboring property
creates a risk of future health consequences and thereby dimin-
ishes one's use and enjoyment of property, an action for damages
should be allowed or, in appropriate cases, plaintiffs like those in
Kell, should be allowed to enjoin pesticide application that threat-
ens to diminish such use and enjoyment. 272
In addition, most cases involving personal injury caused by
exposure to chemical pesticides premise recovery on the manu-
facturer or applicator's failure to warn of the dangers associated
with( the use of the product. Although usually unstated, courts in
failure to warn cases implicitly assume that the benefits of a prod-
uct outweigh its risks; however, the manufacturer has a responsi-
bility to render the product as safe as possible by issuing
appropriate warnings. 273 However, as shown above, it is highly
questionable whether in cases involving pesticide exposure this
assumption is valid. Thus, in cases involving human exposure to
pesticides, courts should follow Villari and allow plaintiffs to pro-
ceed in actions against sellers and manufacturers on the theory of
strict products liability. However, rather than focusing on the
warnings, courts should submit to juries the question of whether
the defendant has sold a "product in a defective condition unrea-
269. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, D. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON
TORTS § 13, at 67 (5th ed. 1984).
270. Id. at 620.
271. Burns v. Jaquays Mining Corp., 156 Ariz. 375, 379, 752 P.2d 28, 32
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1988) (citing RESTATMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 929 (1986))
(plaintiffs exposed to asbestos from defendant's mill and tailings pile).
272. See W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, D. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON
ON TORTS § 89, at 640-41, 647 (injunctive relief particularly appropriate in pol-
lution cases).
273. See, e.g., Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th
Cir. 1973), cert. demied 419 U.S. 869 (1974).
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sonably dangerous to the user or consumer. " 274 In many juris-
dictions, such a question would compel the jury to weigh the risks
against the benefits of the product by considering the following
seven factors:
(1) The usefulness and desirability of the product - its
utility'to the user and to the public as a whole.
(2) The safety aspects of the product - the likelihood
that it will cause injury, and the probable seriousness of
the injury.
(3) The availability of a substitute product which would
meet the same need and not be as unsafe.
(4) The manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe
character of the product without impairing its usefulness
or making it too expensive to maintain its utility.
(5) The user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of
care in the use of the product.
(6) The user's anticipated awareness of the dangers in-
herent in the product and their avoidability, because of
general public knowledge of the obvious condition of
the product, or of the existence of suitable warnings or
instructions.
(7) The feasibility, on the part of the manufacturer, of
spreading the loss by setting the price of the product or
carrying liability insurance. 275
A risk-utility analysis would put before the jury not only informa-
tion about the risks to human health caused by pesticide use and
any information concerning its questionable utility, but also infor-
mation about alternatives to chemical pesticide use that are less
risky, such as integrated pest management practices, sustainable
agricultural practices, and hand clearing of noxious weeds. In ad-
dition to information regarding the adequacy of warnings, other
relevant evidence would include information about overuse of
pesticides and the inability of individuals to protect themselves
from the risks associated with pesticide exposure.
Rethinking the appropriate standard of liability does not, of
274. A well-known formulation of this principle is found in the RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1986).
275. Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'g Co., 76 N.J. 15, -, 386 A.2d 816, 826-
27 (1978) (quoting Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss.
L.J. 825, 837-38 (1973)). See also Caterpillar Tractor v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871
(Alaska 1979); Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., Inc., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225,
573 P.2d 443 (1978).
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course, eliminate the need to determine whether exposure to pes-
ticides caused the plaintiff's injury, a barrier to recovery in toxic
tort cases generally. Proof of causation invariably involves intro-
duction of epidemiological evidence, which rarely establishes a
decisive link between exposure and injury. In pesticide exposure
cases, courts should allow plaintiffs to introduce health effects
studies involving not only the pesticide to which the plaintiff was
exposed, but also those in related groups. For example, pesti-
cides could be classified on the basis of chemical structure. Tox-
icity data obtained for one pesticide could be introduced in cases
involving other chemically-related pesticides. Thus, a plaintiff ex-
posed to an inadequately studied pesticide would not be at a dis-
advantage due to the paucity of data to support his case.
In addition, animal studies should be introduced when con-
ducted in accordance with accepted guidelines, such as those dis-
cussed in Part 11.276 Certainly, the fact that a particular plaintiff is
unusually sensitive to the pesticide should not prohibit recovery.
Instances of severe reactions to pesticides are coming to light.2 7 7
These cases may represent unusual sensitivity to a pesticide.
However, they also suggest that there are pesticide-associated risk
factors yet to be discovered. It would be virtually impossible for a
pesticide manufacturer to provide, and for the government to
evaluate, data regarding all of the factors that would increase a
person's sensitivity to a pesticide.
Nonetheless, cases of sensitive plaintiffs should be treated in
the same manner as the organic farmers in Langan, and the manu-
facturer or user of a pesticide that profits from its sale and use
276. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
277. For example, in 1986, Branch &Jacqz, Is Carabyl as Safe as Its Reputa-
tion?, 80 Am. J. MED. 659-64 (1986), reported the case of a seventy-five year old
man who was found to have headaches, memory loss, anorexia, and weight loss;
these symptoms correlated with long-term exposure to the pesticide carbaryl (a-
naphthyl-N-methylcarbamate) - an acetylcholinesterase inhibitor. The wife and
child of the patient were not affected.
Subsequent studies of the patient revealed that he was taking cimetidine for
an ulcer condition. Cimetidine inhibits enzymes in the liver that eliminate com-
pounds such as carbaryl from the system; the physicians postulated that the pa-
tient's sensitivity to carbaryl was due to his inability to metabolize and eliminate
the pesticide.
To test this hypothesis, a human volunteer was exposed to carbaryl before
and after taking cimetidine. As expected, clearance of carbaryl from the blood
was significantly decreased after the volunteer was treated with cimetidine.
Ward, 26 CLINICAL ToxicOL. 269-81 (1988).
Cases of sensitive individuals suffering as a result of exposure to commonly
used lawn care pesticides marketed as "safe" and "practically non-toxic" are
recounted in Hearings, supra note 6.
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should compensate one who is deprived of his health because of
such sale or use.278 Such a result is consistent with cases involv-
ing exposure to other toxicants that hold that a product seller has
a duty to foresee and warn against the remote possibility that a
small number of users will experience a severe reaction. 279
Furthermore, even when plaintiffs cannot demonstrate pres-
ent injury caused by a pesticide known to increase their risk of
developing cancer, genetic defects and developmental problems
in future generations, courts should follow the lead of those
courts that have awarded medical surveillance costs to such plain-
tiffs. 28 0 Such awards assure plaintiffs that funds will be available
to pay medical costs, and perhaps lost wages, if serious disease
develops.
Finally, courts should follow Ferebee and find that FIFRA does
not preempt tort actions in accordance with state law. Not only
does preemption law compel this conclusion, but in addition, the
types of evidence appropriate to a tort case may never have been
considered in the registration process under FIFRA. Thus,
FIFRA cannot be relied on to adequately protect individual's
rights to be free from exposure to dangerous substances.
The foregoing conclusion does not, of course, preclude the
passage of state statutes and local ordinances to restrict pesticide
use, which is, perhaps the clearest way for those concerned about
the health risks associated with pesticide exposure to limit the use
of chemical pesticides.
There has been sharp disagreement over the extent to which
state and local legislation limiting pesticide use has been pre-
empted by FIFRA. 28 l However, the Second Circuit recently ex-
278. See Gergel, slip op. at 10 (obligation to warn product users of idiosyn-
cratic reactions to pesticide is jury question).
279. See, e.g., Billiar v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 623 F.2d 240, 246 (2d
Cir. 1980); Tiderman v. Fleetwood Homes, 102 Wash. 2d 334, 684 P.2d 1302
(1984).
280. See, e.g., Merry v. Westinghouse, 684 F. Supp. 847 (M.D. Pa. 1988);
Burns v. Jaquays Mining Co., 156 Ariz. 375, 752 P.2d 28 (1987); Ayers v. Jack-
son Township, 106 N.J. 557, 525 A.2d 287 (1987).
281. Compare New York State Pesticide Coalition, Inc. v. Jorling, 874 F.2d
115 (2d Cir. 1989) (state notification program not preempted); Coparr, Ltd. v.
City of Boulder, 735 F. Supp. 363 (D. Colo. 1989); D-Con Co., Inc. v. Allenby,
728 F. Supp. 605 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (additional warnings required by Proposition
65 not preempted); Central Maine Power Co. v. Town of Lebanon, 571 A.2d
1189 (Me. 1990) (local ordinance prohibiting nonagricultural commercial spray-
ing of herbicides not preempted); Deukmejian v. County of Mendocino, 36 Cal.
3d 476, 204 Cal. Rptr. 897, 683 P.2d 1150 (1984) (county initiative ordinance
prohibiting aerial appreciation of phenoxy herbicides for reforestation not pre-
empted) with Maryland Pest Control Ass'n v. Montgomery County, 646 F. Supp.
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plained why FIFRA's provision prohibiting state labeling
requirements in addition to or different from those required
under FIFRA should not preclude state and local governments
from requiring that additional information be given to those who
may be exposed to pesticide application or from otherwise re-
stricting pesticide use:
The meaning of the word "labeling" as used in the
statute is decisive .... "Labeling" is better understood
by its relationship ... to the product. Clearly, since the
key function of the scheme is to identify and describe the
poisonous chemicals, statutory labeling may include a
warning. But this does not bar all similar statements.
FIFRA "labeling" is designed to be read and followed by
the end user .... By contrast, the target audience of the
New York notification program is those innocent mem-
bers of the general public who may unwittingly happen
upon an area where strong poisons are present as well as
those who contract to have pesticides applied .... The
New York Regulations .. . ensure minimum warnings to
the public at large and a greater degree of disclosure to
those contracting to have pesticides applied [and do not
conflict with section 24(b)].
In enacting § 24(b) Congress clearly sought to set
minimum standards for pesticide labeling,... not to pre-
vent states from regulating the "sale and use" of the poi-
sonous chemical substances ... [that] serve to further the
purpose of [FIFRA] by enlisting state aid to prevent "un-
reasonable adverse effects [of pesticide use] on the
environment." 28 2
Thus, not only should courts recognize the real risks of pesti-
cide use in deciding cases seeking post hoc compensation, legisla-
tive bodies can and should develop measures to protect local
109 (D. Md. 1986) aff'd 822 F.2d 55 (4th Cir. 1987) (posting and notice require-
ments in county ordinance preempted); Mortier v. Town of Casey, 154 Wis. 2d
18, 452 N.W.2d 555 (Wis. 1990) (ordinance limiting aerial spraying of pesticides
preempted).
282. New York State Pesticide Coalition v.Jorling, 874 F.2d at 118-19 (cita-
tions omitted). See also Central Me. Power v. Town of Lebanon, slip op. at 7
(presumptions of federal supremacy does not invalidate local regulation of
safety and health matters, such as pesticide regulation).
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residents from the health and environmental effects of unneces-
sary use of synthetic chemical pesticides.
The authors recognize that the foregoing conclusions have
been reached without differentiating among types of pesticides
with different chemical compositions and that all pesticides are
not equal in terms of the risk that they pose to human health and
the environment. This failure to differentiate is due to the prob-
lem in health effects studies. When an individual or population is
exposed to a variety of pesticides or pesticides with several active
and so-called inert ingredients, it may be impossible to determine
which pesticide or ingredient(s) caused the disease or symptoms.
The ill-health could have resulted from synergistic effects of more
than one chemical. This inability to draw clear conclusions about
the effects of pesticide exposure is exacerbated by the problem
that much information that would allow the medical and scientific
community to develop more precise information regarding chem-
ical make-up and consequent effects of pesticides is shielded from
the public.
This is not to say that any plaintiff who has been exposed to
any pesticide should be able to recover from anyone connected
with the manufacture or use of the pesticides generally. Rather, a
plaintiff should be able to proceed with a claim upon demonstra-
tion of his or her unconsented exposure to a pesticide that was
used or manufactured by a defendant and that created a signifi-
cant risk of harm to the plaintiff. Exposure would be demon-
strated in the same way as in property damage and drenching
cases. Lack of consent could be shown, as in property damage
and drenching cases, by evidence that a pesticide applied on a
neighboring property drifted onto the plaintiff's property,
thereby disturbing the plaintiff's use and enjoyment. In cases
brought by plaintiffs who are users of pesticides, failure to pro-
vide information about risks of exposure that might influence the
user's decision to use the pesticide and would indicate lack of
consent. Epidemiological, in vitro, and animal studies would be
relevant to prove significant risk of harm. Significant risk of harm
should not mean a greater than 50% probability of developing
disease because, under such a rule, few would ever recover.
Rather, risk significant enough that the plaintiff would have cho-
sen to avoid the risk or to require medical intervention would suf-
fice. Also, a plaintiff who is exposed to several pesticides or a
pesticide with more than one ingredient that may be responsible
for his or her harm or for creating a significant risk of harm,
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should not be required to identify which particular ingredient
caused the harm. The plaintiff's burden would be satisfied by
demonstrating that each defendant, by manufacturing or applying
one of the substances to which plaintiff was exposed, contributed
to the creation of the significant risk of harm. 283 Naturally, a de-
fendant would have an opportunity to rebut this evidence of sig-
nificant risk, and any recovery would vary by the significance of
the risk of harm caused.
Such a rule would advance a number of policies. As some
courts have recognized in the case of other products with delayed
effects, the defendant whose conduct in marketing the product
played a significant role in creating unavailability of proof should
bear the cost of injury rather than the innocent plaintiff.284 Also,
the manufacturer is in the best position to discover and guard
against defects in its products and to warn of harmful effects.
Thus, holding the manufacturer liable for defects and failure to
warn of harmful effects will provide an incentive to product
safety.285 Similarly, where exposure to a particular product cre-
ates a significant risk of harm, liability rules that encourage pesti-
cide manufacturers and applicators to communicate the risks to
those likely to be exposed, consumers can make more informed
choices about whether to use the pesticide in light of the risks,
and bystanders will have some opportunity to protect themselves
from exposure. When individuals are deprived of the choice to
protect themselves from exposure causing significant risk of
harm, that deprivation is an invasion of a legally protected inter-
est and should be compensable.
The foregoing rule should not result in overcompensation.
Meeting the burden of proving significant risk of harm will still
require the use of experts to evaluate the available safety data to
determine the nature of the risk. In the case of some substances,
such as a naturally occurring substance used as a fertilizer, which
are regulated as pesticides under FIFRA, but whose chemical
characteristics suggest no human health effects, for which epide-
miological studies show that exposed populations have no in-
creased incidence of disease over background levels and for
which animal and in vitro studies indicate no ill-health effects, a
283. SeeJorling, 874 F.2d at 118-19; Central Me. Power, slip op. at 7; Martin v.
Abbott Laboratories, 102 Wash. 2d 581, 689 P.2d 368 (Wash. 1984); Collins v.
Eli Lilly Co., 116 Wis. 2d 166, 342 N.W.2d 37 (1984).
284. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 607
P.2d 924, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
285. Id.
1990] 429
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plaintiff exposed to such a pesticide, albeit without consent, will
be unable to show a significant risk of harm and will be unable to
recover.
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